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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 20, 1998, academics, practitioners, and governmental officials from the People's Republic of China (PRC), and representatives from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Committee on the Red Cross (ICRC) and other institutions gathered in
* Attorney, The Center for Justice and Accountability. B.A. Standford University;
J.D. Yale Law School. The author, a former law clerk for the Office of the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, served as Rapporteur of
the Symposium. The author has to the best of her ability reflected the positions of the
various speakers by transcribing notes from audiotapes of the proceedings. She has interjected citations to elaborate the topics discussed.

(1)
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Beijing to discuss the establishment of a permanent international
criminal court (ICC). 1 At the time of the symposium, delegates representing the nations of the world had met on several prior occasions 2 to
draft a consolidated text that was to serve as the basis for negotiations
at a Diplomatic Conference in Rome, Italy in July 1998.1 The Beijing
symposium addressed the most contentious and still unresolved issues
facing the Statute's drafters, namely the jurisdiction of the Court (jurisdiction rationae materiae), its trigger mechanisms and administration, and the relationship between the Court and both the Security
Council and domestic criminal law systems. The symposium was unprecedented in that it brought together for the first time top officials
of the PRC and the ICTY to discuss the structure, powers and administration of the future ICC in light of the experience of the ICTY and
ICTR and the impact of the ICC on the development of international
humanitarian law.
During the symposium, the establishment of the ICC was taken
as a foregone conclusion; however, there was significant disagreement
about the way this future institution should operate and the powers it
should possess. Participants from the two ad hoc criminal tribunals
and the ICRC spoke forcibly about the need to establish a politically
independent court with coercive powers vis-A-vis States. In particular,
1. This event was co-sponsored by the International Law Institute of Peking University and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at Lund
University. In addition, the following entities were instrumental in bringing this symposium
to fruition: the Supreme People's Court of China, the Chinese Ministries of Justice and
Foreign Affairs, the Chinese Society of the Red Cross, the China University of Political
Science, and the Beijing law offices of Wei-yu. The origin of the symposium can be traced
to an October 1997 meeting convened at Peking University on the implementation of international humanitarian law. At that event, representatives from the Wallenberg Institute
suggested a follow-up symposium on the establishment of a permanent international criminal court (ICC).
2. The formal process towards the creation of a permanent international criminal
court was revived 1989 when the General Assembly asked the International Law Commission (ILC) to address the establishment of a permanent international criminal court and
then to create a draft Statute. See General Assembly Resolutions 45/41 (28 November
1990), 46/54 (9 December 1991), 47/33 (25 November 1992), and 48/31 (9 December 1993).
After the ILC's draft had been examined by an ad hoc committee, the General Assembly
in 1995 created a subsidiary body, the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court (PrepCom), to pick up where the ILC and the ad hoc committee had left off. See General Assembly Resolution 50/46 (11 December 1995). After
convening six separate sessions, the PrepCom produced a revised draft Statute that served
as the basis for the negotiations in Rome. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1 (14
April 1998) (1998 Report).
3. During that Conference, delegates adopted-almost unanimously-a final Statute.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (17 July
1998) (Rome Statute).

HeinOnline -- 17 Chinese (Taiwan) Y.B. Int'l L. & Aff. 2 1998-1999

Vol. 17, 1998-1999

CHINESE YEARBOOK

the representatives from the two tribunals recounted their attempts to
elicit State cooperation in the face of State intransigence in the hope
that this would inform the drafting of the ICC Statute. These individuals also emphasized the importance of ensuring a prosecutor with
proprio motu powers. In contrast, some participants from the PRC
were more cautious, although there was clearly no unified position
among the group. Individuals frequently expressed concerns about the
Court assuming a position of primacy over national courts and insisted
that the institution be founded upon the principle of state consent
rather than state coercion. Individuals from the PRC also advocated
that the Court be subject to the will of the U.N. Security Council,
especially with respect to situations involving claims of aggression.
This Article recounts significant portions of the symposium debate, touching upon areas of the draft Statute that, at the time, remained unresolved. It then provides a brief Epilogue that describes
the way in which these debates were resolved and the various interventions made and positions taken by the PRC during the Rome
Conference.'
II.

BACKGROUND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT

Professor RAO Geping of Peking University began his opening
remarks with the observation that the idea of establishing a permanent international criminal court is not a new one. At the conclusion
of World War I, the League of Nations debated the establishment of a
high court of international justice to try crimes against international
public order and the universal laws of nations, but it was concluded
that the time was not "ripe" for such an endeavor.' Now, after the
world community has been witness to many more conflicts resulting in
many millions of victims, the concept of a permanent international
criminal court is finally high on the United Nations' agenda. However,
it was noted that the road to the ICC is not necessarily a "royal" one;
rather, opinions continue to diverge regarding certain key issues that
constitute the subject of the present symposium. Participants were reminded that "the future is always bright, but the road to it is always
4. This latter material is drawn from the author's own notes and analyses from the
Conference as supplemented by notes compiled by members of the NGO Coalition for an
International Criminal Court.
5. See Timothy L.H. McCormick, "Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and
the Development of International Criminal Law," 60 Albany Law Review, 681, 702-3
(1997).
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arduous." Professor Rao urged participants to take unswerving steps
toward a future that can guarantee peace all of humankind.
Judge WANG Tieya spoke next in his dual capacity as host-as
the founding director of the International Law Institute-and guestas a judge on the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY and ICTR. Judge
Wang described the two ad hoc tribunals as "laboratories for a permanent ICC." He traced the history of the establishment of the ICTY
and the ICTR as subsidiary organs of the Security Council6 and emphasized the way in which the tribunals have preserved their judicial
independence by not becoming political instruments subject to the will
of the Security Council. At the same time, he stressed the importance
of State cooperation in ensuring the effective functioning of the two
ad hoc tribunals.
Judge WANG introduced the "Big Three" of the ICTY-the
President of the ICTY, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald; the ICTY's
Registrar, Judge Dorothee de Sampayo; and the two tribunals' Chief
Prosecutor, Judge Louise Arbour. The three keynote speakers highlighted some of the challenges facing the establishment of the ICC and
the symposium participants. Judge McDonald noted at the outset that
it was an honor and a privilege to work with two of China's sons: the
late Judge Li, whose loss was felt dearly and whose daughter attended
the symposium, and Judge WANG Tieya, editor of the Chinese Yearbook of International Law since 1982 who joined the Appeals Chamber at its busiest time with three appeals pending.
Judge McDonald stressed the importance of promoting constructive dialogue and debate about the form to be taken by the ICC and
noted that the present symposium would provide a major contribution
to this effort. She observed that China was a fitting host for this venture given that by virtue of its membership in the Security Council,
China played an important part in establishing the ICTY and the
ICTR whose success catalyzed efforts toward the establishment of the
ICC. She described China's support for the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC
and international justice as characteristic of its history and its rich
6. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, annexed to Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph
2 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. GAOR, May 19, 1993, U.N. Doc S/25704,
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Soc. S1Res/827 (1993) (ICTY Statute); International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994),
reprinted at 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994) (ICIR Statute).
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philosophical commitment to the concept that right should triumph
over might. In particular, she invoked SUN Tzu's The Art of War written in 500 B.C., which could be considered the first humanitarian law
handbook and which articulated one of the fundamental pillars of international humanitarian law-the concept of superior responsibility
(i.e. the principle that a superior official is responsible for the criminal
acts of his or her subordinates).7
Judge McDonald opined that the present conference was occurring at a critical juncture in the development of international law. She
noted that today's international humanitarian law combines the laws
of war, a body of law with an ancient pedigree, and the more recent
corpus of human rights law, which is partially a product of the perceived failings of the laws of war. She noted that the international
community is finally firmly committed to the rule of law over the rule
of force, and few seriously challenge the idea of the ICC, although its
precise contours are still being debated. Given the success of the two
ad hoc tribunals and the impending establishment of the ICC, she predicted that the international community is on the eve of an era in
which accountability will become the norm rather than the exception.
She concedes the existence of nay-sayers who would question the relevance of the tribunals to their daily lives, but counters with three
responses.
First, she noted that we are inextricably bound to each other by
our common humanity. Any one's suffering diminishes us all. Second,
the nature of the atrocities over which the ICC will have jurisdictiongenocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of persecution perpetrated on the basis of the happenstance of ethnicity-effect
us all because they strike at our very humanity. Attempts to annihilate
a part of our species indicate a potential to annihilate our entire species. Third, the perpetrators of these atrocities are not members of an
aberrant segment of humanity. For various and complex reasons, normal people-cafe owners, civil servants, and the like-became embroiled in the madness that characterized the summary execution of
over 8000 men at Srebrenica, s the gang rape of young women in Foca
camp,9 and the forcing of a man to eat his own son's liver. As was
noted by Judge Riad of Egypt, a judge on the Trial Chamber who
7. See, e.g., Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Samuel B. Griffith, trans. 1963), at 125 ("Now
when troops flee, are insubordinate, distressed, collapse in disorder or are routed, it is the
fault of the general.").
8. The Prosecutorv. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, Indictment ("Srebrenica"),
Case No. IT-95-18-I (16 November 1995).
9. See, e.g., The Prosecutorv. Dragolub Kunarac, Indictment, Case No. IT-96-23-PT
(19 August 1998).
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confirmed the second indictment against Radovan Karadzic and
Ratko Mladic, events such as these portray "scenes from hell, written
on the darkest pages of human history."1 Judge McDonald emphasized that the international community operates under a moral imperative to bring to an end the type of madness that engulfed the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
In her mind, efforts such as the two ad hoc tribunals and the ICC
are crucial to such an endeavor. The rule of law is always the first
casualty of war and must be the first element of conflict resolution and
peace building. The attribution of individual accountability and the
creation of an accurate historical record of such conflicts prevents revisionism and provides a catalyst for peace and reconciliation. She
concluded by emphasizing that no one can credibly claim that they do
not have a stake in this process.
Judge Arbour, the Chief Prosecutor of both the ICTY and ICTR,
noted that being involved with the tribunal has been an awesome and
humbling experience because it has forced her to confront great
human suffering and cruelty. She emphasized that the subject of the
symposium is vitally important given that the international community
has not heretofore given itself the means to punish and prevent such
atrocities. As a result, there is enormous excitement surrounding the
concept of a permanent ICC. She noted, however, that the establishment of the ICC will require attention both to great matters of principle and to detailed minutiae. She predicted that no individual view
will prevail and it will be necessary to shape a Court acceptable to a
broad spectrum of States with the assistance of expert jurists who can
contribute both academic and technical skills.
Judge de Sampayo, the Registrar for the ICTY, noted that the
international community has advanced beyond the stage in which the
establishment of an ICC is mere wishful thinking, but she cautioned
that we are still not assured of the success of these efforts. The act of
establishment will indeed be a milestone of great symbolic value because it will mark an authoritative expression of the wills of States to
enforce international humanitarian law; however, she predicted that
subsequent developments will be of greater significance if the Court is
to function effectively and fairly. The ICC will need flexibility to adapt
to unforeseen situations as they arise. The ICTY has developed a
unique set of procedures that are more than the sum of their parts. No
one set of national rules predominates in keeping with the practice of
international law to seek the most effective solution. Judge de
10. The Prosecutorv. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, Review of the Indictment,

Case No. IT-95-18-I (16 November 1995), at p. 1.
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Sampayo predicted that the ICC too will thrive under these differing
perspectives.
III.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF ICC NEGOTIATIONS

According to Professor Peter Malanczuk, Chair of International
Law at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the precursors of the contemporary effort to establish a permanent ICC date back as early as
1474 and the trial of Peter von Hagenback for murder and other
charges brought by the Archduke of Austria before an international
tribunal composed of judges from the allied states of the Holy Roman
Empire." As this illustrious history was too long to relate, Professor
Malanczuk opted to turn immediately to the current status of the ICC
negotiation process. He cautioned that from the "outside," it is difficult to glean the true positions of States and the actual status of negotiations. But, he noted, it is possible to identify the contentious issues.
In fact, at the time of the symposium, the current draft Statute still
contained approximately 1700 brackets in 116 articles indicating that
much of the text remained in flux. In particular, the key political issues-the organization of the Court and its relationship to the Security Council, the role of the prosecutor, the funding of the Court, and
the crimes over which the Court will have jurisdiction-remain unresolved, and it may be that these issues can only be solved by consensus under the time pressure of the Rome Conference.
Professor Malanczuk outlined the means that were available to
the international community to establish a permanent international
Court. The first method available is that which led to the creation of
the two ad hoc tribunals,' 2 namely creation by the Security Council
acting under its Chapter VII powers.' 3 The arguments against this
route centered on concerns regarding the legal authority of the Security Council in this regard given that it would have been difficult to
argue the existence of a concrete threat to international peace and
security as required by Chapter VII. With respect to the Yugoslav and
Rwandan tribunals, it was determined that establishment by the Security Council was the only practical solution given that the conflicts
were ongoing there and concluding a treaty would take too long. Furthermore, it remains to be resolved to what extent the Security Coun11. See Susan Tiefenbrun, Editor's Message, "Peace with Justice," 3 Hofstra Law &
Policy Symposium 1, 7 (1999).
12. See S.C. Res. 955 (1994) (establishing the Rwanda Tribunal) and 827 (1993) (establishing the Yugoslav Tribunal).
13. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter grants the Security Council the power to take
action with respect to "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression."
U.N. Charter, Chapter VII.
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cil can delegate powers it does not itself possess (e.g. judicial
powers).' 4 This issue has been addressed in the Tadic jurisdictional
appeal 5 and with respect to other subsidiary bodies, such as the

United Nations Compensation Commission established for claims
against Iraq.1 6 States have indicated their consent to this practice in

these contexts, but this might not be the case with respect to future
endeavors. Finally, it was felt that the ICC must have near universal

support, and creation by the Security Council under the direction of
the so-called "permanent five" alone would not provide the Court
with the legitimacy necessary to guarantee universal scope.

The second option was creation by a General Assembly resolution or a joint General Assembly/Security Council resolution. It was
noted that having the support of the General Assembly as evidenced
by such a resolution would provide significant moral and symbolic le-

gitimacy to a future Court. According to the prevailing view in the
literature, however, the General Assembly cannot adopt binding reso-

lutions except with respect to U.N. budgetary and administrative matters;1 7 only the Security Council can issue binding resolutions more
14. See generally "Comments by Larry Johnson, Prosecuting and Defending Violations
of Genocide and Humanitarian Law: The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia," American Society of International Law and Procedure (1994) at 256 ("Certainly the
Chinese and the Brazilians raised very basic reservations concerning the competency of the
Security Council to establish such a tribunal pursuant to chapter VII enforcement mechanisms. The Chinese in particular insisted that this whole endeavour violated the basic principle of state sovereignty"); Tara Sapru, "Into the Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the
Foray of the Security Council Tribunal into the Rwandan Crisis," 32 Texas International
Law Journal329 (1997) (arguing that the Security Council exceeded its powers in establishing the Rwanda tribunal); Aaron K. Baltes, "Prosecutor v. Tadic: Legitimizing the Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia," 49 Maine Law
Review 577 (1997); Faiza Patel King, "Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia Tribunal's Development of Limits on the Security Council's Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter," 16
Emory InternationalLaw Review 509 (1996).
15. The Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995), at 15-24 (finding that
the ICTY was established in accordance with appropriate procedures under the U.N.
Charter).
16. See S.C. Res. 692 (20 May 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 846 (1991) (establishing the
Commission). See generally Veijo Heiskanen & Robert O'Brien, "United Nations Compensation Commission Sets Precedents on Government Claims," 92 American Journal of
International Law 339 (1998).
17. The classic position is that "[r]esolutions 'are capable, like many other things, of
contributing to the formation of lex communis, and can in that sense constitute material
influencing the content of the law, but not creating it."' Gregory J. Kerwin, Note, "The
Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Determining Principles of International Law in United States Courts," 1983 Duke Law Journal 876, 880 n.26 (quoting
Gerald Fitzmaurice, "The Future of Public International Law and of the International Legal System in the Circumstances of Today," in Livre du centenaire, 1873-1973, at 196, 269
(1973)).
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generally. However, there is a contingent of States within the General
believe
Assembly, notably from so-called Third World States, who
18

that the General Assembly can issue binding resolutions.
Third, the Court could be established through an amendment to
the U.N. Charter. 9 Professor Malanczuk described this option as impractical because it could amount to the opening of a "Pandora's
box." Moreover, this route could take too long, as evidenced by longstanding efforts to reform the membership of the Security Council.2"

The fourth and final option was the option ultimately chosen-the
promulgation of a multilateral treaty. This option has several obvious
drawbacks. For one, a treaty depends upon State consent, and support
for the Court may not be universal. Second, without a provision to the
contrary, States will undoubtedly attempt to enter reservations in order to effectively opt out of certain undesirable provisions.
Despite these drawbacks, however, the United Nations and other
members of the international community determined that this route
would best ensure broad-based support for the Court from the nations
of the world and, by extension, a considerable measure of legitimacy

gained from this universality.
At the time of the symposium, it remained to be determined the
number of ratifications that would be necessary to bring the Statute
into force. 2 One option is the model adopted in human rights treaties
which generally require a limited number of ratifications. The result
would be a quick treaty but not necessarily a universal one.
18. See G.A. Res. 2332, U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1975) ("[Tjhe development of international law may be reflected, inter alia, by declarations and resolutions of the General Assembly which may to that extent be taken into
consideration by the International Court of Justice."); see also Oscar M. Garibaldi, "The
Legal Status of General Assembly Resolutions: Some Conceptual Observations," 73 American Society of InternationalLaw 324, 325 (1979) (discussing growing weight accorded to
General Assembly resolutions, especially in the Third World).
19. See Article 108, U.N. Charter ("Amendments to the present Charter shall come
into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote
of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.").
20. See Michelle Smith, "Expanding Permanent Membership in the United Nations
Security Council: Opening a Pandora's Box or Needed Changes?," 12 DickinsonJournalof
InternationalLaw 173 (1993).
21. The Rome Statute shall enter into force following the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification. Rome Statute, Article 126.
22. See, e.g., Article 8, 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of the Statutes of
Limitations, adopted by G.A. Res. 2391 of November 26, 1968, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
18), U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968), reprinted in 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (requiring ten ratifications for
entry into force).
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The other model would require many more ratifications such that
it may take years for the Statute to enter into force. Finally, Professor
Malanczuk discussed the prognosis for a proposed merger between
the ICTY and the ICC. He noted that the real problem with this proposal is a technical one: the legal basis of the ICTY is a Security Council resolution promulgated under Chapter VII whereas the legal basis
for the ICC will be a multilateral treaty. Security Council powers are
not unlimited, so it would be difficult for the Council to simply decree
such a merger.
During the discussion period, Mr. LIU Daqun of the Department
of Treaty and Law for the Foreign Ministry of the PRC suggested that
if the international community is serious about wanting to establish a
universally acceptable international criminal court, it should amend
the U.N. Charter and create such a Court as a principal organ of the
United Nations so that it will be on the same footing as the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 2 3 He observed that no State, except perhaps the United States,2 4 challenges the independence or impartiality
of the ICJ. He predicted that establishing the Court by amendment
would solve all of the outstanding jurisdictional and consent dilemmas
presented by the current deliberations. Mr. Payam Akhavan, Legal
Advisor to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY, clarified that the
establishment of the ICC through treaty provisions or otherwise
would not prevent the Security Council from establishing future ad
hoc tribunals. Mr. Liu agreed that the Council would retain the power
to establish additional ad hoc tribunals, as has been proposed for example for Burundi2 5 or Cambodia.2"
Finally, Professor Malanczuk outlined the primary positions of
State delegations. He observed at the outset that all State delegates
are verbally in favor of the project, but he emphasized that it is at this
stage "politically incorrect" to express opposition to the Court. The
23. See Article 7, U.N. Charter ("There are established as the principal organs of the
United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council,
a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.").
24. See U.S. Withdrawal, Department Statement, Dep't. St. Bull., No. 20961, March
1985, at 64, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985); Letter from Secretary of State George P.
Shultz to Secretary-General of the United Nations Javier Perez de Cuellar (Oct. 7, 1985),
reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985) (terminating U.S. acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
of International Court of Justice).
25. See Payam Akhavan, "Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of
Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda," 7 Duke
Journal of Comparative and InternationalLaw 325 (1997).

26. See Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General
Assembly resolution 52/135, U.N. Doc. A/53/850, S/1999/231, Annex (16 March 1999) (recommending the establishment of an international tribunal to try members of the Khmer
Rouge for international crimes committed from 1975-1979).
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first position can best be described as one of skepticism. Its leading
proponents are India, Nigeria and France and other States concerned
with retaining maximum sovereignty and minimizing the proliferation
of multilateral bodies with enforcement powers over states. Second,
there are cautious state delegates who are generally in favor of the
establishment of a Court but one with a restricted scope. States in this
camp are four of the five permanent members of the Security Council
(minus the United Kingdom), Japan and about 15 other states.
These state delegates are prepared to make limited compromises,
but they are unwilling to cede too much state sovereignty to such an
international body or to create a body with powers on par with those
of the Security Council. They emphasize the importance of state consent and want to retain strong power for the Security Council vis-A-vis
the Court. The primary concerns of the United States at present seem
to be with issues of national security and the potential exposure of its
peacekeepers operating abroad. The U.K., formerly in this camp, had
of late joined the so-called "like-minded states" which at the time of
the symposium contained over 50 states, including most members of
the E.U. and several Asian countries such as Singapore and South
Korea. The like-minded states are generally in favor of a strong and
independent Court with a broad jurisdictional reach and an independent prosecutor. Finally, the fourth group, which is the majority and
includes members of the C.I.S. and so-called Third World states, have
not presented a coherent approach due in part to a lack of interest and
technical expertise.
IV.

CRIMES SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF
THE ICC

Professor LI Zhaojie of the International Law Institute of Peking
University opened the panel on crimes subject to the jurisdiction of
the ICC. At the outset, Professor Malanczuk explained that, the operation of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege ("no crime without
law") 2 7 is different with respect to the drafting of the ICC Statute. In
order to satisfy this principle, the drafters of the Statutes of the ICTY
and ICTR had to define the state of international law as it existed at
the time of the conflicts. In contrast, the drafters of the ICC can engage in progressive development of international law because the
27. This principle finds expression in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 15, G.A. Res.
2200 A (XXI) (16 December 1966) ("No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national
or international law, at the time when it was committed.").
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Court will have jurisdiction over prospective crimes 28 and future potential defendants will be on notice of the illegality of enumerated
acts.
Mr. Mohamed Othman, Senior Legal Advisor of the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICTR, provided a comprehensive discussion
of issues of concern and consensus surrounding the subject matter jurisdiction of the future ICC. He explained that the current Statute
contemplates five major categories of crimes: genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, the crime of aggression and a basket of other
crimes governed by international conventions. 2 9 The original International Law Commission draft did not envision that the Statute would
define the crimes precisely.3" However, over time, delegates insisted
that an enumeration and definition of crimes was necessary from the
perspective of notice to an accused and to guide the prosecution of
offences. Mr. Othman approved of this decision by noting that notwithstanding fairly detailed definitions of crimes in the ICTR Statute,
there have been numerous claims based on alleged defects in the form
of the indictment.3 1 He observed that it is essential to provide for an
enumerative definition of crimes in order to meet the legality requirements of criminal law and to put the accused on notice of the potential
scope of his or her liability.
Mr. Othman noted that the most current draft proposal provides
that the Court would have inherent jurisdiction over the crime of genocide only and that regrettably all other crimes would be subject to a
complex and cumbersome opt in/opt out regime.32 Professor LING
Tan, China University of Political Science and Law, elaborated that
according to some state proposals, ratification of the Statute does not
necessarily mean that a particular state has accepted jurisdiction over
all of the crimes covered by the Statute. These proposals would require the state to "opt in" to jurisdiction over each and every crime
28. See 1998 Report, Article 8(1), 38 ("The Court has jurisdiction only in respect of
crimes committed after the date of entry into force of this Statute") (bracketed). This provision appears at Article 11 in the final text.
29. See Article 5, 1998 Report, at 12-35 (outlining Court's proposed subject matter
jurisdiction). So-called "treaty crimes" are those crimes prohibited by specific multilateral
treaties, such as the crimes of terrorism, narcotics trafficking and crimes against United
Nations personnel.
30. See Article 20, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/49/
355, (1 September 1994), at 10-11 (listing crimes without definition).
31. See, e.g., The Prosecutorv. Jean-PaulAkeyesu, Decision on the Preliminary Motion
Submitted by the Defense on the Form of the Indictment and Exclusion of Evidence, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T (27 September 1996).
32. See Article 9, 1998 Report, at 38-40 (outlining options for consent regime).
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enumerated by the Statute with the exception of genocide, over which
the Court would have inherent jurisdiction.3 3
Mr. Zhu noted further that some proposals require that in order
to conduct an investigation, it will be necessary to have the consent of
at least three states: (1) the custodial state, i.e. the state with custody
over the accused; (2) the territorial state, the state in which the crimes
occurred and the state that would unequivocally have jurisdiction over
the crimes; and, (3) the state of nationality, i.e., the state of the nationality of the accused. 34 According to this proposal, only when the matter is referred to the Court by the Security Council acting under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter would the consent of these other
states not be required.
Professor Ling observed that, under these terms, the treaty at
best would result in a permanent ad hoc tribunal. Furthermore, these
consent requirements are inconsistent with a complementary system;
rather, they create a system in which the ICC is merely an alternative
forum for trials. She opined that in order to reflect the principle of
complementarity, the ICC must be able to assume jurisdiction whenever national courts are unable to assume jurisdiction, regardless of
whether the state "consented" to such jurisdiction. Mr. Akhavan similarly criticized the ICC Statute's proposed consent regime. He predicted that unilateral assertions of sovereignty facilitated by this
regime would render the ICC ineffective.
Ms. Marie-Claude Roberge, Legal Advisor of the International
Committee on the Red Cross, noted that the Geneva Conventions of
1949 provide for universal jurisdiction over treaty violations such that
all states have the power to prosecute offenders.35 In other words,
state Z can prosecute a war criminal from country X for committing a
crime in country Y without the consent of either X or Y. In practice,
of course, the cooperation of these latter states may be essential in
order to stage a credible prosecution, but no formal "consent" is tech33. See bracketed Article 9 (Options 1 and 2), 1998 Report, at 38-40 (providing inherent jurisdiction over some still unenumerated crimes and requiring states to opt in to jurisdiction over others).
34. See Article 7, 1998 Report, at 36-7 (requiring consent of custodial state, territorial
state, requesting state, and the state of which the victim is a national); see also id., Article
11, at 43 (requiring at option 2 similar consent structure for state referrals).
35. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Article 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 62; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the
Armed Forces at Sea, Article 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116; Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 236;
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 146,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386.
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nically required. Therefore, it is clear that the application of international humanitarian law is restricted by the current consent provisions
of the draft Statute. In this way, the consent regime contained in the
current ICC Statute represents a contraction of international humanitarian law. Thus, in order to maintain the level of protection already
available under the Geneva Conventions, the Court should not need
the consent of either the custodial or territorial state in order to prosecute a particular individual.
Mr. Othman noted that while all delegates accept that the Court
must have jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the inclusion of the crime of aggression remains controversial. He noted that there is a consensus definition of
"aggression" drafted by the General Assembly in 1974, which incorporates various enumerated acts. 36 However, this definition is concerned only with the allocation of state responsibility and does
contemplate the assignment of individual criminal responsibility. Proposed provisions governing the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime
of aggression provide that the Security Council must have first declared a situation to involve an act of aggression in order for the Court
to rule on the liability of a particular individual. 37 This provision is
based on the argument that the U.N. Charter confers upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
According to Mr. Othman, requiring such a Security Council determination before the ICC would accept jurisdiction raises concerns
because the Security Council is fundamentally a political body. There
are situations when the Security Council remains "actively seized" of
a matter or does not decide definitively on a particular situation for a
considerable time, which may delay consideration by the Court. For
example, with respect to the situation in Rwanda, the Security Council
avoided labeling the situation as "genocide" until June of 1994 even
though the Security Council had been effectively seized of the situation since April of that year.3" The groundwork for a finding of the
36. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31)
162, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (defining aggression at Article 1 as "the use of armed force
by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.").
37. See Article 10, 1998 Report, at 40 (stating in option 1 that "[A complaint of or
directly related to [an act] [a crime] of aggression [referred to in article 5] may [not] be
brought [under the Statute] unless the Security Council has [first] [determined] [formally
decided] that the acts of a State that is the subject of the complaint [is] [is not] an act of
aggression [in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations].").
38. See S.C. Res. 912 (21 April 1994) ("Appalled at the ensuing largescale violence in
Rwanda, which has resulted in the death of thousands of innocent civilians..."); S.C. Res.
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individual criminal responsibility of an accused should not be dependent upon a political consensus reached by the Council. The practice
of the International Court of Justice demonstrates that it is possible
for both the Court and the Security Council to be seized simultaneously of a matter that could amount to a threat to the peace or an act
of aggression. 39

Professor Malanczuk noted that few state delegates wanted to include the crime of aggression in the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Court until Germany proposed it in February 1997.40 He reminded the
participants that the IMT Statute included jurisdiction over crimes
against the peace.4 1 He described the 1974 General Assembly resolution definition of aggression as a "non-definition" and noted the difficulties in articulating precise elements for the crime of aggression.
Acts of aggression are highly contentious political issues not amenable

to criminal adjudications requiring respect for due process concerns.
He agreed with Mr. Othman's assessment that the ICC is concerned
with allocating individual criminal responsibility and that it is contrary
to all principles of criminal justice for a political body to establish the
basis of liability of an individual without reference to that individual's

own acts.
Furthermore, under the proposed system, a defendant would not
be able to invoke a claim of self-defense because the Security Council
would have already determined that the individual's state engaged in
918 (17 May 1994) ("Strongly condemning the ongoing violence in Rwanda and particularly condemning the very numerous killings of civilians..."); S.C. Res. 925 (8 June 1994);
S.C. Res. 929 (22 June 1994) ("Deeply concerned by the continuation of systematic and
widespread killings of the civilian population in Rwanda..."); S.C. Res. 928 (20 June 1994);
S.C. Res. 935 (1 July 1994) ("Expressing once again its concern at the continuing reports
indicating that systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian
law, including acts of genocide, have been committed in Rwanda.") (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14 (Judgment of June 27); see also Paul W. Kahn, "From
Nuremberg to The Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua v. United States and
the Development of International Law," 12 Yale Journal of International Law 1 (1987);
Vera Gowlland-Debbas, "The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and
the Security Council in Light of the Lockerbie Case," 88 American Journalof International
Law 643 (1994).
40. See Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at Its Session Held from 11 to
21 February 1997, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.5 (12 March 1997), at 14-15 (providing draft
elements of the crime of aggression for the first time).
41. Crimes against the peace were defined at Article 6(a) of the IMT Charter as: "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing." Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279
(entered into force Aug. 8, 1945).
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an act of aggression. Professor Malanczuk proposed that it would be
preferable for the Statute to allow the Security Council to refer cases
to the Court in which it has determined that an act of aggression occurred. The Court then would be fully capable of re-assessing the situation from the perspective of assigning individual criminal
responsibility where appropriate.4 2
Mr. Liu observed that the Security Council chooses its words
carefully. For example, with respect to the Nicaragua conflict, nowhere did it employ the term "aggression." 3 Rather, it referred only
to the existence of an "armed conflict." Including aggression as a
"crime" within the Statute is inappropriate, because an act of aggression can only be committed by a state or a group, and it is difficult to
envision a situation in which an individual would engage in an act of
aggression. Mr. Liu was of the opinion that the compromise proposal
outlined above by Professor Malanczuk has the potential to generate
illogical results. For example, what if the Security Council determines
that a state engaged in an act of aggression, but the ICC determines
that the state's leader is not guilty of the crime of aggression?
Ms. Roberge focused her presentation on one issue-the scope of
the prohibition against war crimes-as an example of the difficulties
inherent to Preparatory Committee negotiations. She began by outlining the primary documents containing the laws of war. She noted that
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which govern international and to
some extent internal armed conflicts, have been ratified by 188 states
and as such represent customary international law.4 4 The inclusion in
the ICC Statute of the prohibitions contained in these Conventions
and applicable in international armed conflicts is uncontested, but
state delegations are less willing to include reference to the laws of
war governing internal armed conflicts. She advocated for the inclusion in the Statute of the violations of the laws of war addressed in the
1977 Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, which have been
ratified by 151 and 143 states, respectively.4 5
42. See Article 10(5), 1998 Report, at 41 ("[A referral of a matter to the Court...
by the Security Council shall not be interpreted as in any way affecting the independence
of the Court in its determination of the criminal responsibility of the person concerned.").
43. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. No. S/PV.2694-98 (July 1-3, 1986).
44. See Theodor Meron, "The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law," 81 American
Journal of InternationalLaw 348 (1987).

45. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I, 11 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M.

1391 (1977) (Protocol I); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Pro-
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Protocol II in particular is concerned with non-international
armed conflicts and its wide ratification indicates that the majority of
states have accepted that war crimes committed in internal conflicts
generate individual criminal responsibility. This conclusion is also evidenced by various military manuals, statements by states, and international and national jurisprudence.4 6 As such, she argued that the ICC
should have jurisdiction over war crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts. A Court without such jurisdiction would risk
being ineffective because most conflicts in the world today are best
characterized as internal ones. Despite this obvious truth, there remains a handful of states that does not want the definition of war
crimes to include acts taken in non-international armed conflicts.
In response to a question regarding the United States proposal to
include a requirement that war crimes be committed on a "widespread
or systematic" basis in order for them to come before the Court, Ms.
Roberge noted that this proposal to include a threshold requirement
for war crimes has received strong opposition from other states. Such
a threshold requirement has never been required in international law
and when compared with the general admissibility requirements for
the entire Statute, the U.S. proposal is duplicative.4 7 A compromise
proposal has emerged that would grant jurisdiction over only the most
serious crimes, "in particular" when war crimes are taken on widespread or systematic basis.
Finally, Ms. Roberge responded to Mr. Othman's plea for the inclusion of precise criminal elements in the definitions of crimes in the
Statute. She observed that the current ICC draft contains a 16-page
definition of war crimes.4 8 Ms. Roberge recounted that it has been
difficult for state delegates to agree on a list of war crimes, although
they have basically agreed on the general elements of the offenses.
This difficulty in deciding upon the particular war crimes to be included within the Statute is due in part to the fact that nations have
enacted very specific prohibitions of war crimes in their domestic legislation. This has provoked a debate over whether the ICC Statute
should adopt the language of the major international instruments outtocol II), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I, 11 (1977),
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) (Protocol II).
46. See generally Theodor Meron, "International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities," 89 American Journal of International Law 554 (1995).

47. The Statute's Preamble indicates that the intent is to establish a court "with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern of the international community as a
whole."
48. See Article 5, 1998 Report, at 17-30 (detailing scope of prohibition against war
crimes).
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lining humanitarian law or whether the Statute and Court should refer
instead to the precepts of customary international law. States that
have not ratified the Protocols would prefer the latter. The problem is,
however, that there is no agreed upon definition of war crimes under
customary law. Similarly, it has not been decided if the Court would
be empowered to refer to the predicate international humanitarian
law instruments to interpret its Statute.
The United States, which has not ratified the Protocols, has proposed that the Statute include not only a recitation of war crimes-a
list that has not yet been decided upon-but also an enumeration of
the elements of each and every war crime. For example, it has not
been decided whether the starvation of a civilian population will constitute a war crime under the Statute. In order to include it in the
Statute, the United States would like the Statute to provide an exhaustive discussion of each element of this offense. This approach is
well-founded in a domestic legal order in which crimes are generally
meticulously defined. International law, however, generally is not
characterized by such detailed definitions. Rather, it is left to national
and international courts to interpret the full scope of a particular international law norm. Although it is important that the basic elements
an offense be enumerated in order to satisfy the principle of legality,
to require that each and every war crime be meticulously defined in
terms of its constitutive elements creates an undesirable additional
burden at this stage in the drafting of the Statute.49
Mr. Akhavan turned to a discussion of another crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court: crimes against humanity,5" and specifically
the mental element of the offense. He noted that one of the challenges
49. The U.S. ultimately prevailed in this regard. According to Article 9 of the Rome
Statute, the Assembly of States Parties shall adopt elements of crimes to assist the Court in
the interpretation and application of the relevant substantive law. At the time of publication, state delegates have convened a series of meetings under the rubric of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court to draft these elements for
adoption. See, e.g., Proposal Submitted by the United States of America (Draft Elements
of Crimes), U.N. Doc. No. PCNICC/1999/DP.4 (4 February 1999).
50. See Article 5, 1998 Report, at 30 (defining crimes against humanity as "any of the
following acts when committed [as part of a widespread [and] [or] systematic commission
of such acts against any population]: [as part of a widespread [and] [or] systematic attack
against any [civilian] population] [committed on a massive scale] [in armed conflict] [on
political, philosophical, racial, ethnic or religious grounds or any other arbitrarily defined
grounds]: .

.

. (a) murder); (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation...; (e)

[detention or] [imprisonment] ... ; (f) torture; (g) rape or other sexual abuse... (h) persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural or religious [or gender] [or other similar] grounds [and in connection with other
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court]; (i) enforced disappearance of persons; (j) other
inhumane acts...") (citations removed).
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facing the drafters of international penal legislation is determining
when international law can justifiably interfere in what would otherwise be a domestic crime within the internal jurisdiction of a state. In
other words, it must be determined which crimes are of such magnitude that they merit international concern and intervention. Crimes
against humanity do not necessarily involve the violation of the sovereign rights of one state by another. As a result, unlike with the offense
of war crimes under the Geneva Conventions, a perpetrator may be
guilty of a crime against humanity committed against a victim of the
same nationality.
The mental element of crimes against humanity is thus crucial to
delimiting crimes against humanity from ordinary crimes. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber in the Tadic case held that the accused must
have knowledge that his acts "fit within" a larger attack against a civilian population.51 In other words, Tadic's acts constituted crimes
against humanity because he was aware of the broader context in
which his acts fit. This interpretation of the mental state requirement
renders the prohibition against crimes against humanity more relevant
to mid-level defendants than policy makers. In the Erdemovic case,
the majority, with the late Judge Li dissenting,52 held that crimes
against humanity are more serious than war crimes due to the mental
intent element defining the former.53
The definition of crimes against humanity is not the same in the
ICTY and ICTR Statutes. The latter Statute adds two elements not
present in the former: (1) the acts must be taken on widespread or
systematic grounds and (2) the acts must be taken on discriminatory
grounds. 5" With respect to this first element, the International Law
Commission has treated these two characteristics as disjunctive rather
than conjunctive such that the prosecutor must demonstrate that the

51. The Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (7 May
1997), at 252-4 (holding that the perpetrator must know of the broader context in which his
acts occur).
52. The Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Li, Case No. IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997), at 10-15 (arguing that the intrinsic nature of the
underlying act-and not its formal legal classification-determines a crime's gravity).
53. Id., Judgment, at 17-22.
54. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
year, 3400th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, Annex (1994) (defining crimes against humanity at Article 3 as any of the "following crimes when committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or
religious grounds: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e)
Imprisonment; (f) Torture; (g) Rape; (h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious
grounds; (i) Other inhumane acts.").
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attack was either widespread or systematic.55 The former implies a
large scale attack with numerous victims such as occurred during the
execution of 8000 individuals after the fall of Srebrenica. The latter

implies the existence of a pattern of repeated acts over time and
across a geographic area. The ICTY Statute includes the war nexus,5 6
which is absent from the ICTR Statute.
In the interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction in the Tadic case, the

Appeals Chamber observed that by including the war nexus in the
definition of crimes against humanity in the ICTY Statute, the Security Council chose to define the offense more narrowly than customary
international law which has abandoned the war nexus.5 7 In other
words, the ICTY's definition of crimes against humanity deviates from
customary international law such that proof that the acts were con-

nected to war is required only for the purposes of prosecutions before
the ICTY. In the current draft Statute of the ICC, the war nexus, the

discriminatory intent requirement, and the disjunctive nature of the
requirement of widespread or systematic action remain in dispute.58
To the definition of crimes against humanity in the ICTY Statute,
the Tadic Trial Chamber added a second component to the mental

state element when it required proof that the defendant acted with
discriminatory intent, i.e. he acted against his victim on racial, ethnic,
religious, political or national grounds.5 9 The Chamber admitted that

this requirements does not exist in customary international law, but it
imposed it nonetheless in keeping with the views of the SecretaryGeneral6" and three members of the U.N. Security Council's "Perma-

nent Five"-France, the United States and Russia.61 This formulation

created some conceptual confusion with respect to the crime of perse55. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-ninth
Session, (1994) G.A.O.R., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, at 76.
56. ICTY Statute, Article 5 (defining crimes against humanity as "the following crimes
when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: (a) murder...").
57. The Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995), at 73 (holding that it is a
settled rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity do not require a
connection to international armed conflict and noting that the Security Council may have
defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary under customary international
law).
58. See supra note 50.
59. The Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (7 May
1997), at 348 (holding that in order to qualify as crimes against humanity, acts must be
taken on discriminatory grounds).
60. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 6, at para. 48.
61. See Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting, U.N. Doc. S[PV.3217 (25 May 1993), at 11, 16 and 45 (including discriminatory grounds as part of the definition of crimes against humanity).
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cution, one of the enumerated crimes against humanity, which in the
Statute uniquely requires that acts be taken on specified discriminatory grounds. The IMT Charter formulation of the definition of crimes

against humanity at Article 6(c) included two categories of crimesinhumane acts and crimes of persecution. 62 The latter category encompassed acts taken on specified discriminatory grounds.
The OTP of the ICTY had advanced an interpretation of the Stat-

ute that would allow for the attribution of liability for inhumane acts
in conjunction with liability for acts of persecution when such acts are
taken with discriminatory intent.6 3 By requiring evidence of a discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity, the Tadic Trial Chamber collapsed these two categories of crimes and severely limited the
scope of the prohibition against the crime of persecution. This formulation also excludes crimes not committed on enumerated grounds, for
example the extermination of the handicapped or gay and lesbian persons by the Nazis.'
In the ICC draft documents, it has been suggested that the Statute contain an exhaustive rather than illustrative list of acts constituting crimes against humanity.6 5 One option within the ICC draft
Statute mirrors the Tadic judgment and includes the requirement that
the defendant acted on discriminatory grounds.6 6 By including this element for all crimes against humanity and not just for acts of persecution alone, the drafters have negated the crime of persecution.
Although the ICC draft Statute is preferable to the Trial Chamber's
formulation in that it makes the grounds of commission illustrative, it
still unacceptably excludes liability for random acts of mass violence.
In response to a question regarding the status of the inclusion of
the so-called treaty crimes-crimes involving narcotics,6 7 crimes
62. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (entered into force Aug. 8, 1945) (defining crimes against humanity as: "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated.").
63. The Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic, Brief of Argument of the Prosecutor (Cross-Appellant), Case No. IT-94-1-A (12 January 1998) at 75.
64. Id. at 76.
65. See 1998 Report, at 31 n.17 (requesting further clarification of "(j) other inhumane
acts").
66. See Article 5, 1998 Report, at 30 (defining crimes against humanity in one option as
"any of the following acts when committed. .. [on political, philosophical, racial, ethnic or
religious grounds or any other arbitrarily defined grounds]: (a) murder... .
67. See Article 5, 1998 Report, at 34-5.

HeinOnline -- 17 Chinese (Taiwan) Y.B. Int'l L. & Aff. 21 1998-1999

22

THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

against United Nations personnel, 68 and terrorism 6 9-Mr. Akhavan
observed that Trinidad and Tobago first initiated discussions on the
ICC in order to address these crimes. Although the nature of these
crimes does not involve state elites, Mr. Akhavan was of the opinion
that they were still appropriate for inclusion within the Statute. He
suggested that the Lockerbie bombing case would represent an excellent case for the ICC given that there was no agreement determining
which state should prosecute the crime. Professor Malanczuk observed that these crimes are of a different nature than the other core
crimes that possess an erga omnes character which is to say that all
states may prosecute them. The latter species of crimes allow states to
prosecute offenders even if they are not directly affected,
as was ar70
ticulated in the Barcelona Traction case before the ICJ.
Mr. JIA Bingbing, Legal Officer of the ICTY, discussed the way
in which national criminal law concepts can be applied in an international forum as general principles of law. Pursuant to Article 38 of the
Statute of the ICJ, the sources of international law include positive
law in the form of treaties, customary law, and general principles of
law recognized by "civilized" nations.7 1 Custom is not the equivalent
of general principles of law. For one, customary law contains definitive rules which are distinct from principles. A rule is generally considered a binding precept whereas a principle is a general truth that can
serve as a theoretical basis for a rule. In contradistinction to customary law, there is no requirement that general principles of law be accepted by the majority of states.
Even though they are derived from national law, general principles of law form part of general international law. In the International
Status of South West Africa case, the International Court of Justice
considered the duty of an international tribunal when confronted with
a new institution.7 2 The Court noted that it is impossible to simply
import rules from domestic law into international law. Rather, international tribunals must regard features of domestic law as an indica68. Id. at 33-34.
69. Id. at 33.
70. [1970] ICJ Rep. 3.
71. According to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, "The Court... shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized
by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of general practice accepted
as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the
provisions of Article 59 [providing no precedential value to ICJ Decisions] judicial decision
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." Statute of the International Court of
Justice, Art. 38, 50 Stat. 1055 (1945).
72. [1950] ICJ Rep. 148.
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tion of general principles. General principles have influenced and
been applied by international tribunals, but this has generally been in
civil as opposed to penal law situations. For example, in the Nuclear
Tests Case, the ICJ determined that the principle of good faith represented a fundamental principle of the international legal order.7 3 It
was noted that at the time of the symposium, the role to be played by
general principles within the jurisprudence of the future Court had
not yet been determined.7 4
Criminal defenses, such as the defense of duress, are unique to
municipal law institutions. The ICTY Statute does not address defenses per se. The Report of the Secretary-General noted that "Acting
upon an order of a Government or a superior cannot relieve the perpetrator of the crime of his criminal responsibility and should not be a
defense. Obedience to superior orders may, however, be considered a
mitigating factor, should the International Tribunal determine that
justice so requires. '75 The Report also indicates that "The international Tribunal itself will have to decide upon various personal defenses which may relieve a person of individual criminal
responsibility, such as minimum age or mental capacity, drawing upon
general principles of law recognized by all nations. ' 76 In the
Erdemovic case, the ICTY was forced to consider the way in which the
defense of duress would operate on the international level.
It became clear in the case that no consistent practice exists with
respect to the defense of duress.7 7 The only international law precedent was the Einsatzgruppen case, decided after World War 11.78 In
this case, the tribunal referred to United States, Soviet, and German
law in discussing criminal defenses, although the case did not involve
murder per se. As a result of this lack of clear international prece73. Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France, [1974] ICJ Rep. 253, at 268.

74. In the final Statute, general principles of law appear as a subsidiary source of law
after the ICC's Statute, Elements of Crimes, and Rules of Procedure and Evidence; and
then applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law. Rome Statute,
Article 21. This proved to be an issue of great debate as delegates split over whether the
Statute should allow the Court to apply general principles of law derived from national
laws of the legal systems of the world or whether the Court would be limited to applying
national laws directly pursuant to a hierarchy of sources. According to the latter position,
the Court would apply first the law of the state where the crime was committed, second,
the law of the state of nationality of the accused, and finally, the law of the custodial state.
See 1998 Report, Article 20, at 55-56.
75. Report of the Secretary General, supra note 6, at para. 57.
76. Id. at para. 58.
77. The Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-A (7 October
1997), at 38-63.
78. U.S. v. Ohlendorf,IV Trials of War CriminalsBefore the Nuremberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10, 411 (1950).
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dent, it was necessary for the ICTY to consult national law. Two tentative propositions emerged in a necessarily representative sampling of
states: first, common law systems generally do not allow the defense
of duress for murder;79 and second, civil law states generally do.80
However, the number of cases in which the defendant is successful in
the latter systems is limited. The conclusion to be drawn from this
survey is that the defense of duress can be applied in cases other than
murder, which was the decision of the Appeals Chamber. 81 This question has not yet been resolved with respect to the ICC Statute, but
certain proposals dealing with the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility would provide similarly.82
Colonel ZHANG Jingen of the People's Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences discussed the way in which the principle of
according individual criminal responsibility for war crimes and crimes
against the peace articulated at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials was
incorporated into the Chinese domestic legal system. In the Chinese
system, almost all rules relating to humanitarian law form part of the
PRC's domestic and military legislation, such as the Law of National
Defense. 83 The Chinese People's Court has jurisdiction over crimes
against the peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes.8 4 The People's Liberation Army is a revolutionary army whose task is to defend
China. It is subject to strict rules of discipline that require soldiers to
follow orders, refrain from damaging civilian property or mistreating
captives, speak politely, pay fairly for what is purchased, etc. These
rules are substantially in conformity with international humanitarian
law. Furthermore, international treaties to which China is a party
form part of China's domestic law pursuant to legislation enacted by
79. The Prosecutorv. Drazen Erdemovic, Judgement, Case No. IT-96-22-A (7 October
1997), at 48-51.
80. Id. at 41-48.
81. The Prosecutorv. Drazen Erdemovic, Judgement, Case No. IT-96-22-A (7 October
1997), at 75 (concluding that duress does not afford a complete defense to a soldier
charged with the killing of innocent civilians).
82. See Article 31(d), 1998 Report, at 68-69 ([the person reasonably believes that]
there is a threat of [immanent] death or serious bodily harm against the person or another
person ... and the person acts reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the person's
action [causes] [was not intended to cause] [n]either death [n]or a greater harm than the
one sought to be avoided") (citations removed). The final Statute recognizes variations of
the following grounds for excluding criminal responsibility: mental disease or defect, intoxication, self-defense, duress, and other grounds derived from the applicable law. Rome
Statute, Art. 31.
83. See National People's Congress, Law of National Defense (Zhing Hua Renmin
Gong He Guo Guo Fang Fa) (March 14, 1997).
84. See, e.g., People's Republic of China, Criminal Code (March 14, 1997), Article 446
(addressing crimes committed by soldiers in war time).
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85
the National People's Congress, China's supreme legislative body.
As such, treaties possess a higher status than domestic law.
Colonel Zhang recounted China's long history of enforcing international humanitarian law. In 1956, after the founding of the PRC, the
Supreme People's Court established two special military courts to try
Japanese war criminals for their crimes committed from 1931-1949. s6
Individuals were convicted of war crimes, crimes against the peace,
and espionage centering on the following acts: seizing power in China,
violating international humanitarian law, enslaving and mistreating
the Chinese people, plundering property, engaging in rape and enforced prostitution, and launching germ warfare.
In these trials, the tribunals followed the principles established by
the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials in trying and punishing Japanese war
criminals. For example, it was determined that the most severe punishment must be accorded to the "core" culprits, but secondary
criminals who showed repentance would be treated leniently or exempted from prosecution. Forty-five Japanese defendants were convicted as "core" criminals for their participation in implementing
Japan's imperialist aggression against China. Furthermore, war crimes
committed under orders did not relieve the perpetrators of responsibility, but this claim could mitigate punishment in certain circumstances. In particular, it was determined that individuals with high
ranks who committed atrocities could not claim the defense of superior orders because they knew of the prohibitions of the laws of war
and had the authority to refuse to execute illegal orders.

V.

STATE COOPERATION AND JURISDICTIONAL
PRIMACY IN THE ICC STATUTE

Mr. Akhavan stressed the importance of state cooperation and
noted that the distinguishing feature of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals vis-A-vis the ICTY and the ICTR is that the former tribunals
were established after the unconditional surrender of the states involved. This enabled those tribunals to operate effectively in Germany
and Japan in terms of collecting evidence and capturing the accused.
In contrast, the two ad hoc tribunals are not based on this model of
"victor's justice." Their alternative genesis necessitates the coopera85. See People's Republic of China, Civil Procedure Code (Apr. 9, 1991), Article 238;
People's Republic of China, General Principles of Civil Law (Apr. 12, 1987), Article 238
(treaties prevail over inconsistent national law).
86. These trials are discussed in various volumes of the Yearbook of the People's Court
(Dang Dai Zhong Guo Gongan Gongzuo); the Contemporary Public Security Works of
the PRC; and Contemporary Judicial Works (Dang Dai Zhong Guo Shangpan Gongzuo).
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tion of states, especially successor states of the former Yugoslavia, in
order to arrest the accused, investigate alleged crimes, conduct trials,
and punish the perpetrators. In effect, the two tribunals could not operate without the cooperation of states.
State cooperation with the ad hoc tribunals is statutorily based.
According to Articles 29 and 28 of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes,
respectively:
(1) States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law. (2) States shall
comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an
order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to: (a)
the identification and location of persons; (b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence; (c) the service of documents;
(d) the arrest or detention of persons; (e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal.
The obligations contained in these Articles originate from the U.N.
Charter given that the tribunals were established under Chapter VII.87
These obligations were challenged in the case against General
Tihomir Blaskic, which involved charges of war crimes and crimes
against humanity in connection with the killing, deportation and inhumane treatment of civilians in the Lasva Valley region in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. 8s Croatia failed to cooperate with requests from the Office of the Prosecutor to obtain evidence that had the potential to be
both inculpatory and exculpatory. As a result, the OTP requested the
Court to issue to Croatia a binding order in the form of a subpoena in
order to obtain these documents.8 9 Croatia argued that under international law, sovereign states are not bound to cooperate given that the
Statute referenced only "voluntary cooperation." 90 On appeal, numerous states, such as Norway, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Canada
and China, submitted briefs amicus curiae on this question. 91 The Ap87. See supra note 6.
88. The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Indictment, Case No. IT-95-14-T (25 April
1997).
89. The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Ex Parte Request by the Prosecutor For the
Issuance of a Subpoena Duces Tecum, Case No. IT-95-14-T (10 January 1997).
90. The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Brief of the Republic of
Croatia on Subpoenae Duces Tecum (1 April 1997).
91. The Chinese submission argued that the ICTY is constrained by its Security Council mandate, which does not expressly empower it to issue legally binding orders to states
or to assume jurisdiction over states. The Prosecutorv. Tihomir Blaskic, Brief Amicus Curiae of the Government of the People's Republic of China in Response to the Invitation of
the Appeals Chamber Dated 29 July 1997, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108bis (15 September
1997).
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peals Chamber ultimately ruled that it was in fact empowered to issue
92
binding orders to states.
According to the most recent draft of the ICC Statute, states are
directed to fully cooperate with the Court in the investigation and
prosecution of crimes without delay. 93 This text echoes the ICTY and
ICTR Statutes.9 4 However, subsequent provisions weaken this obligation. For example, draft Article 87 provides that the national law of a
requested state may govern requests for transfers. 95 This gives the national law of states a monopoly over when the Court will exercise jurisdiction. That Article also contemplates allowing states to deny a
request for transfer on, inter alia, the following grounds: (1) when a
person is the national of a requested state and (2) when the information submitted by the office of the prosecutor does not meet the minimum evidentiary requirements of the requested state.96 Mr. Akhavan
was of the opinion that there should be no grounds for refusal given a
duly confirmed order from the Court. Mr. HUANG Feng, Division
Head of the Bureau of Judicial Assistance of the Ministry of Justice,
noted that in the draft Statute, cooperation between state parties and
the ICC is mandatory, but the precise procedural aspects of this cooperation remain unacceptably vague.
In Judge McDonald's eyes, the issue that will make or break the
ICC is the issue of state compliance. Prior drafts of the ICC Statute
have required only that states "cooperate" with the Court. She noted
that "cooperating" is very different from "complying." She stressed
that the Court's Statute must contain a component of compulsion because at the heart of any judicial machine is the power to compel.
Notwithstanding the charisma and reputations of Judge Antonio
Casesse and former Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone, in the first
few years of the tribunal's existence, the tribunal remained unable to
execute arrest warrants. The experience of the ad hoc tribunals dem92. The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of
Croatia For Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Case No. IT-95-14AR108bis, at 16-22.
93. See Article 85, 1998 Report, at 156 ("States Parties shall ... fully cooperate with
the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes under this Statute. States Parties
shall so cooperate without [undue] delay.") (citations removed).
94. See ICTY Statute, Article 29(2) ("States shall comply without delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber...").
95. See Article 87(1), 1998 Report, at 159 ("[2. The national law of a requested state
shall govern the [conditions] [procedure] for granting or denying a request for [surrender]
[transfer] [extradition] [except as otherwise provided in this Part].]"); see also Article 91
("Requests for assistance shall be executed in accordance with the law of the requested
state...").
96. See id., at 159-160 (outlining grounds for refusal).
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onstrates that even in the face of mandatory language as is found in
Article 29, the tribunals have encountered non-compliance. The current draft affords the ICC less power than the ad hoc tribunals possess
and thus represents a step backwards in terms of guaranteeing accountability for international crimes.
Judge de Sampayo agreed that it will be vital for states to cooperate in the discharge of the Court's mandate. She noted that the ICTY,
for example, is entirely dependent on states to enforce its prison
sentences. To date, however, only a handful of states have concluded
the necessary legislation in this regard. The record is similar with respect to witness protection efforts. Witnesses of fact have lived
through terrible experiences, and the act of testifying often revives
these experiences and victimizes witnesses for a second time. Relocating victims and witnesses can result in victimization for a third time.
The international community must accept the responsibility for protecting vulnerable witnesses. In particular, states must offer relocation
services and fund the victims and witnesses program. Finally, state cooperation is also required in order to enable the ICTY to gain access
to evidentiary material. The ICC will be a "high maintenance" judicial
body and states will retain a high degree of responsibility for its effective functioning.
Judge Arbour was in agreement that for one, nothing is possible
without state cooperation, but at the same time some things cannot be
done without some form of compulsion or coercion. She noted that
there is a difference in reality between formal cooperation and de
facto cooperation. The ad hoc tribunals have received quite a bit of de
facto cooperation from states that have yet to enact a formal legal
framework to govern the provision of assistance to the tribunals.
Other states have enacted legislation permitting cooperation, but in
reality their cooperation has been disappointing in that is has been
unresponsive and slow.
In response to a question from Ms. LI Xiaohong, Officer of the
Bureau of Judicial Assistance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Akhavan noted that numerous states have in fact cooperated both formally and informally with the ad hoc tribunals. States have, among
other things, drafted implementing legislation, assisted the tribunal in
locating and interviewing witnesses, and participated in the arrest and
apprehension of the accused. Assistance of this kind has come from
such states as Australia, Pakistan, Turkey, Norway, Germany, Malaysia, Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania. However there have been failures, most notably on the part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
As a result, the tribunal has been forced to utilize its Rule 61 proce-
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dures on numerous occasions.9 7 In contrast, in Rwanda, the former
government is no longer in power, which has made investigations easier there.
At this point, Judge McDonald intervened and observed that an
assessment of the scope of judicial cooperation depends upon one's
definition of "cooperation." All states are required to pass implementing legislation, but to date only 24 states have done so which is a
dismal record. Moreover, according to Article 27 of the ICTY Statute,
Imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the International Tribunal from a list of States which have indicated to the Security Council their willingness to accept convicted persons. Such
imprisonment shall be in accordance with the applicable law of the
State concerned, subject to the supervision of the International
Tribunal.
To date, only three states-Italy, Finland and Norway-have passed
such legislation (and Italy's legislation has not been officially ratified).
Judge de Sampayo intervened to emphasize that there are many
forms of cooperation. Many states, while not concluding blanket legislation to that effect, have in fact provided assistance on a case-by-case
basis. For example, some states have informally offered to relocate
witnesses, although she is reluctant to discuss the content specific
agreements with states because to do so could jeopardize relocated
witnesses. Many other states have offered financial assistance and gratis personnel, including some of the poorest countries of the world like
Namibia.
Ms. Roberge turned to the issue of complementarity, i.e. the relationship between the Court and national jurisdictions. She noted that
it is not envisioned that the Court will operate as an appeals court for
national court judgments; rather, the goal is that the ICC will complement national jurisdictions.9" States have the right and in some situations the obligation to prosecute certain violations of international
criminal law.99 Only when it is demonstrated that the state is unwilling
97. Rule 61 is activated in cases in which there has been a failure to execute an arrest
warrant. It allows the Prosecution to submit the indictment with supporting documentary
and testimonial evidence to the Trial Chamber. If the Prosecutor satisfies the Trial Chamber that the failure to execute personal service was due to a failure or refusal of a state to
cooperate with the tribunal, the President of the Tribunal can so notify the Security Council. See Rule 61(D), ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev.13 (9 and 10 July
1998).
98. The Preamble of the Rome Statute emphasizes that the Court "established under
this Statutes shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions"
99. See, e.g., Article 5(2), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ("Each party shall likewise take such measures as
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offenses in cases where the alleged

HeinOnline -- 17 Chinese (Taiwan) Y.B. Int'l L. & Aff. 29 1998-1999

30

THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

or unable to prosecute will the ICC intervene to seize jurisdiction. It
will be for the ICC to determine when these conditions are satisfied,
although these standards are obviously difficult to define. The notion
of "unable" relates to states that have experienced a total or partial
collapse of their national justice system. More difficult, the notion of
"unwilling" can encompass states that are trying to shield an accused
or that are engaging in undue delays in commencing prosecutions. Ms.
Roberge explained that if a person has been satisfactorily tried by a
national court, the case would be inadmissible under the principle of
non-bis-in-idem and the Court would have no jurisdiction.1 "'
According to Mr. Daqun of the PRC's Department of Treaty and
Law, state consent should be a precondition to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. The international system is composed of sovereign
states and the criminal law in particular is perhaps the supreme expression of state sovereignty. Only if a state is patently unwilling or
unable to exercise jurisdiction over a particular crime should the ICC
accept jurisdiction. This is a fundamental principle behind the entire
endeavor. Mr. Daqun suggested that the issue -of the acceptance of
jurisdiction could be based upon the structure of the ICJ. According
to Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, a state that has become a contracting party does not automatically accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ
over a particular matter; rather, a separate declaration to this effect is
required to seize the Court of jurisdiction.10 1 Certain proposals for the
ICC Statute allow states to cede jurisdiction over some or all crimes in
an opt in/opt out regime. He preferred this model to the model that
would provide that when a state becomes a party to the ICC Statute, it

offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him
pursuant to article 8"); the Geneva Conventions, supra note 35.
100. According to the principle of non bis in idem, no one can be tried twice for the
same crime. See, e.g., Article 10, ICTY Statute ("1. No person shall be tried before a
national court for acts constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law
under the present Statute, for which he has already been tried by the International Tribunal. 2. A person who has been tried by a national court ... may be subsequently tried by
the International Tribunal only if the act was characterized as an ordinary crime or the
national court proceedings were not impartial or independent").
101. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 36, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945) ("2.
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a.
the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the existence of any
fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the
nature of extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
3. The declaration referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time.").
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would automatically accept the jurisdiction of the Court over all core
crimes through the notion of inherent jurisdiction.
Professor Malanczuk reiterated that the text of the preamble indicates that the ICC will operate as a "fall back" jurisdiction. The propriety of ICC jurisdiction will be determined by the Court itself, but in
this regard, it will be necessary for the office of the prosecutor to sufficiently prove the failings of the national court. The United States proposed a "double lock" system in the form of Article llbis. °2
According to this proposal, before investigating a crime or prosecuting an accused, the ICC office of the prosecutor would have to publicly indicate its intention to do so. Any state would then be able to
inform the prosecutor that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or
defendant in question. The ICC's prosecutor would then have to defer
to the national proceedings unless a Pre-Trial Chamber ruled otherwise. It is clear that such a proposal is meant to address the fears of
some states, in particular the United States, that their troops may be
brought before the ICC on charges of violations of international criminal law.
However, Professor Malanczuk responded that given the overarching principle of complementarity, if an effective military or criminal justice system is in place in these states, there would be no
occasion for the ICC to intervene. The proposed llbis has generated
considerable opposition that turns primarily on the negative effect
such a proposal has on the integrity and efficiency of the Court.
Mr. Wenqi ZHU, Legal Advisor to the ICTY, observed that the
relationship between the international and domestic realms are reversed with respect to the ICC Statute vis-A-vis the ICTY Statute. The
ICTY is characterized by a vertical relationship between the international tribunal and national jurisdictions with the former having primacy over the latter. For example, if a national court is prosecuting an
individual who has been indicted by the ICTY or the ICTR, then the
latter institutions can request the national court to "defer" prosecution and transfer the accused to the international tribunal.1 " 3 This rela102. Proposal Submitted by the United States of America, Article llbis: Preliminary
Rulings Regarding Admissibility, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/WG.3/DP.2 (25 March 1998)
("At the request of that State [which has informed the Court that it is investigating a
defendant within its jurisdiction] the prosecutor shall defer to the State's investigation of
such persons unless the Prosecutor determines that there has been a total or partial collapse or unavailability of the State's national judicial system, or the State is unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation and prosecutions. Before the Prosecutor
may commence investigation of such persons, the Prosecutor must obtain a preliminary
ruling from a Pre-Trial Chamber confirming the Prosecutor's determination.").
103. See ICTY Statute, Art. 9.
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tionship is inverted in the current draft of the ICC Statute, which
establishes the primacy of national court jurisdictions.
It was noted by a speaker from the audience that it would be
difficult to contemplate how a judge would determine admissibility
without descending into unacceptable realms of subjectivity. Judge
Arbour responded that she shares these concerns and noted that the
provisions governing the relationship of complementarity are controversial. Under these provisions, if a state has declined to prosecute an
individual for an international crime within the jurisdiction of the
ICC, the office of the prosecutor in order to gain jurisdiction would
essentially have to put a state and its criminal justice system on trial in
order to prove that the state is unable or unwilling to engage in
prosecutions.
This prospect raises several concerns. First, there is the risk of
severe embarrassment to the state. Second, international institutions
are expected to work in partnership with states. If an institution demolishes a state's credibility, this partnership between the Court and
the states would dissolve. Third, the determination of the condition of
"inability" is perhaps easier to adjudicate than that of "unwillingness."
Judge Arbour predicted that the complementarity provision will probably operate to the detriment of developing countries who will be vulnerable to findings of "inability." For example, in Rwanda, there are
130,000 accused awaiting trial. In order to assume jurisdiction over a
particular defendant, the international Court would have to prove that
Rwanda was unwilling or unable to prosecute that individual. Once
this determination is made, what happens to the other 100,000 individuals? The international Court would not be in a position to assume
jurisdiction over all of them and yet they would be left to be prosecuted by a state that was "unable" to prosecute them. Other countries
may face "unwillingness" challenges.
For example, if a particular case was not being tried at the national level but the state could demonstrate the ability to prosecute,
then the ICC prosecutor would have to either withdraw her pursuit of
jurisdiction or decide to prove "unwillingness" on the part of the state,
i.e. that the state is discharging its judicial function improperly or subject to political manipulation. This offer of proof would inevitably involve contentious and politically charged proceedings that would
require, in essence, that the Court try the state itself. This may prove
to be more difficult than trying the underlying criminal case. Pitting
the state against the prosecutor in such a contentious debate before
the case is even tried is extremely problematic.
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A compromise has been suggested. Under this proposal, the prosecution would refer a dispute under the complementarity provisions
to a special chamber composed of an ad hoc panel with broad representation to ensure political credibility. °4 This body could operate in
parallel with the criminal investigation because criminal investigations
are time sensitive. This arrangement would free the ICC judges to engage in criminal prosecutions, rather than evaluate the judicial system
of sovereign states.
Professor ZHANG Yong invoked the fear of some states that the
Court will assume a supervisory function over national courts. It is
clear that in determining a state's "unwillingness" to prosecute, it will
be necessary for the ICC to examine the state's entire legal system
and practice. This could lead to perverse results and an aura of disrespect for the judgment of national courts. For example, in the
Erdemovic case, the defendant was sentenced on appeal to only five
years imprisonment for participating in the summary execution of potentially more than 1000 people in the aftermath of the fall of
Srebrenica. 1°5 The tribunal justified this result on the grounds that the
accused had admitted liability, demonstrated genuine contrition, and
co-operated with the prosecution by providing testimony against other
accused; and on the basis of other personal circumstances of the
accused.1 °6
Many commentators have criticized this sentence as too lenient
given the heinous nature of the crime. A situation can be imagined in
which a similar result were reached by a national court for similar
reasons. Given such a lenient sentence, the ICC could determine that
the national court did not prosecute the individual in good faith, despite the fact that the national court based its judgment upon a host of
balancing factors. Would it be appropriate for the international Court
to intervene in such a situation? Judge McDonald emphasized that
judges are always criticized for the lengths of their sentences, but she
explained that she believes in sentencing the person and not the
crime. The ICTY must also refer to the sentencing practice of the for-

104. Bracketed Article 16 reads: "Before the Prosecutor may commence investigation of
such persons, the Prosecutor must obtain a preliminary ruling from a Pre-Trial Chamber
confirming the Prosecutor's determination [of whether there has been a total or partial
collapse of the State's judicial system or if the State is unwilling or unable to carry out the
investigation and prosecutions]." 1998 Report, at 51.
105. The Prosecutor v. Drazan Erdemovic, Indictment, Case No. IT-96-22-I (29 May
1996).
106. The Prosecutor v. Drazan Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-A,
(5 March 1998).
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mer Yugoslavia, although the judges are not bound by this. 10 7 The result, however, may be the appearance of inconsistent justice. She
hoped that in such a case, the future ICC would examine the national
court record closely before ruling on the credibility of the national
court prosecution.
Professor Malanczuk noted that it is widely believed that it will
be impossible for delegates to obtain primacy for the international
Court over national courts. The consensus is that the Court should
operate as a safety net. Mr. Akhavan countered that there is a distinction between what is realistic politically and what is realistic with respect to establishing an effective Court. The parties to the former
Yugoslavia would not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the ad
hoc tribunal, therefore this condition of primacy is essential to the effective functioning of the ICTY. Professor Malanczuk observed that
the complementarity provisions of the ICC Statute may actually generate the beneficial side effect that national courts more frequently
undertake their obligations to prosecute offenders. He noted that
states can exercise jurisdiction over a crime on the basis of four bases
of jurisdiction: (1) the territorial principle; (2) the nationality principle; (3) the passive personality principle; and (4) the universality principle.1" 8 He predicted that the ICC will strengthen the movement
toward the exercise of universal jurisdiction in national courts and
thus obviate the need to rely on the ICC.
Mr. Akhavan reminded participants that since the establishment
of the two ad hoc tribunals, Austria, Denmark, Germany, France, The
Netherlands, Switzerland and other states have initiated prosecutions
against violators of international criminal law.' 0 9 This was undoubt107. ICTY Statute, Article 24(1) ("In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial
Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the
courts of the former Yugoslavia.").
108. See generally Ian Brownlie, Principlesof Public InternationalLaw 299-305 (3rd ed.
1979).
109. See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Dusko Cvjetkovic, Landesgericht, Salzburg (acquitting Bosnian Serb of genocide charges); Prosecutionv. Refik Saric, Third Chamber of the
Eastern Division of the Danish High Court, 25 November 1994 (sentencing the defendant
to eight years imprisonment for having murdered and tortured inmates of a concentration
camp in Bosnia), confirmed on appeal, Prosecutionv. Refik Saric, Supreme Court of Denmark, 15 August 1995, Ugeskrift for Retsvaesen 1995; Public Prosecutorv. Novislav Djajic,
Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, 23 May 1997 (convicting defendant for having been
an accessory to 14 cases of murder in Bosnia); Public Prosecutor v. Nikola Jorgic, Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf, 26 September 1997 (convicting former leader of a Serb paramilitary group on 11 counts of genocide and 30 counts of murder); Prosecution v. Wenceslas
Munyeshyaka, Cour de Cassation, Paris, 6 January 1998 (prosecution of Rwandan accused
of genocide and crimes against humanity); Prosecutionv. Darko Knesevic, Supreme Court
of the Netherlands, 11 November 1997 (prosecution for war crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims); Prosecution v. Goran Grabez, Military Tribunal Lausanne, 18 April 1997
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edly due in part to a fear of embarrassment for having granted entrance to individuals later accused of committing war crimes in the
former Yugoslavia or Rwanda. Ms. Roberge agreed that the creation
of the ICTY and the ICTR has heralded an increase in domestic prosecutions of war crimes and other international law violations. There
has also been movement toward the adoption of national legislation
providing for universal jurisdiction over violations of the Geneva
Conventions.
Professor LING Tan discussed the proposed relationship between
the ICC and the national courts in light of the experience of the two
ad hoc tribunals. She observed that national jurisdiction over crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda could have been
premised on any of the four bases of jurisdiction. There are situations
in which it will be preferable for the national court to assume jurisdiction over a particular international crime. The rules of procedure of
national courts are better developed than those of the international
system, and domestic courts have the instrumentalities of the state at
their disposal to conduct investigations and trials. The national authorities of successor states have an obligation to try violations perpetrated under a prior regime; however, to date, those states have failed
to fulfil these obligations. The ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia would not have been constituted had the national authorities assumed their international law obligations.
According to Professor Ling, the ICC must be endowed with primacy. Without this, there will be the perennial fear that international
crimes will be improperly characterized as ordinary crimes or that
cases will not be diligently prosecuted. Such stratagems may defeat
the real purpose of the creation of international criminal jurisdiction-the prosecution of violations of international criminal law-and
operate to the detriment of those the ICC is designed to protect. Primacy does not mean that the ICC would supersede domestic courts;
rather, the Court would operate only where domestic jurisdiction
failed. If a state can truly discharge its international obligations, the
ICC should and would not assume jurisdiction. This is guaranteed by
the preamble of the Statute, which sets out the main purposes of the
Court. The Court is to exercise jurisdiction only over serious crimes of
international concern such that it complements national courts and
intervenes only when domestic jurisdictions are unwilling or unable to
prosecute.
(charging defendant with having committed various serious crimes in concentration camps
in Bosnia).
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Mr. HUANG Feng, Division Head of the Bureau of Judicial Assistance of the Ministry of Justice, suggested that the relationship between the ICC and judicial organs of U.N. member states must be
clarified. In his opinion, this relationship should be based on the principle of equality rather than on a vertical relationship as would exist
between an appeals and a lower court. At the same time, it is clear
that the ICC will have great legal and moral authority because of its
experience adjudicating the crimes of international concern, so its decisions should be highly respected. Further, the relationship the Court
must respect the independence of national judicial organs. Successful
judicial cooperation between domestic and international fora must not
be influenced by the bias inherent to political relations. The concerns
of legal scholars often differ from those of diplomats. This potential
for divergent views can become particularly acute in situations in
which a judicial organ refuses to extradite an individual indicted by a
foreign judiciary. This move may be viewed by diplomats as an exercise of state's sovereignty. In contrast, academics may consider it inappropriate in light of the new international legal order (or vice versa).
Professor ZHANG Yong of the Nankai University Law faculty
asked whether the ICC could assume jurisdiction when a national
court tries and convicts (or acquits) an individual for an ordinary
crime that could have been characterized as an international crime
under the ICC Statute. Judge Arbour explained that this situation
raises non-bis-in-idem concerns and that the ICC will undoubtedly not
be in the business of repeating work. However, she explained that in
theory, the ICC could revisit a completed case in certain situations.
For example, where the domestic jurisdiction has underplayed the seriousness of an offense, e.g. where it has tried a massive war crime as a
mere breach of military discipline, the ICC office of the prosecution
may seek to intervene and re-try the individual in order to re-cast the
offense in its proper light.110
The more complex case is one in which a state prosecutes an individual for murder and accords a heavy penalty for an act that is perhaps better characterized as a crime against humanity. If a realistic
and credible result were obtained domestically, it is unlikely that the
ICC prosecution would re-visit the case for the sheer symbolic value
of the proper international legal characterization. It is likely that a
domestic forum would choose the easier route to conviction and try an
110. See, e.g., The Prosecutorv. Goran Jelesic, Indictment, Case No. IT-95-10-PT (20
October 1998) (the accused pled guilty to the predicate acts of genocide (31 counts out of a
32 count indictment), but not to the genocide charge itself; the Prosecution continued the
prosecution on that count alone).
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individual for murder rather than undertake the more complex task of
proving that the crime constituted a crime against humanity given the
additional elements involved in such a prosecution."'
Mr. Zhu intervened with the observation that, according to the
principle of non-bis-in-idem, no one can be tried twice for the same
facts.' 12 However, this principle does not operate between jurisdictions. For example, if someone has been convicted by a national court
for a "common crime," the future ICC could still legally assume jurisdiction over the same act if the act could be characterized as a war
crime or a crime against humanity.
He observed that many states have not integrated international
criminal law concepts into their domestic systems so it would in effect
be impossible to characterize acts as crimes against humanity or war
crimes; rather, the state would have to prosecute such acts as ordinary
murder, assault, kidnapping and the like. In such situations, the Court
should be guided by its object and purpose, which is to enhance international justice and deter future crimes. If this can be accomplished
through the exercise of national jurisdiction under analogous national
laws, then there is no role to be played by the Court in such an
instance.
VI.

NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS BEFORE THE ICC

The question of state national security concerns was raised in the
Blaskic case and the Appeals Chamber addressed at length how the
tribunal should address such concerns when they are raised by states
in the context of investigations or other discovery by the international
tribunal." 3 Professor Malanczuk explained that the key question surrounding this issue is how to test states' claims that a particular piece
of evidence will implicate their national security concerns. There have
been three proposals in this regard. The first, from France, would
leave it to the states to claim that a particular inquiry implicated their
national security interests. In this way, such a claim would act as a
trump card and prevent the discovery of a particular piece of evidence. The second proposal, by the United States, is that the state can
111. See supra note 50.
112. See The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion on the Principle of Non Bis In Idem, Case No. IT-94-1-T (14 November 1995), at 8 (observing that the
non bis in idem principle as it appears in the ICCPR prohibits double jeopardy only with
regard to an adjudication within a single state and it has not been recognized as a norm
with transnational application).
113. The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of
Croatia For Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Case No. IT-95-14AR108bis, at 48-56.
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refuse to abide by an order of the Court on national security grounds,
but the state must first make a formal and detailed declaration to this
effect." 4 The third and most constructive proposal was advanced by
the United Kingdom and would allow the Court to override the states'
claims in certain exceptional circumstances in which the Court
deemed that the state was not acting in good faith." 5 This proposal
provides that the resolution of the issue of national security should be
included within the text of the Statute and not left to the rules of procedure and evidence. This proposal is more in
keeping with the Ap16
peals Chamber decision in the Blaskic case.
Mr. Akhavan observed that requests for state cooperation by the
Court will have the potential to implicate states' national security concerns. In the fact-finding process, the Court will need access to a
broad spectrum of testimonial and documentary evidence. At the
same time, provision must be made for legitimate national security
concerns of relevant states, as was noted in the Blaskic decision. It is
necessary to develop a mechanism for balancing these competing concerns when documents and information are relevant to ensuring a fair
trial, but where the state claims the release of such information will
raise serious national security concerns. This conflict is particularly
acute in the international system. In a national system, these competing interests exist in the same jurisdiction; however, this is not the case
in the international system. In principle, it should be the Court that
makes the final determination of the propriety of articulated national
security concerns.
In Mr. Akhavan's opinion, the U.K. proposal outlined above
presents the most appropriate and balanced approach. According to
this proposal, only where a state is not acting in good faith would the
114. Proposal Submitted by the United States of America, Sensitive National Security
Information, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/WG.4/DP.26 (20 March 1998) (providing that "A
State Party may deny a request for assistance, in whole or in part, only if ...

(c) ...

it

determines that there are no conditions under which it can comply with the request without seriously prejudicing its national security interests" after complying with certain procedures involving notification, consultation with the Prosecutor or Court, and disclosure).
115. Proposal submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Protection of Sensitive Information the Disclosure of Which Would Prejudice the National
Security Interests of States, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/WG.4/DP.20 (19 March 1998) (noting that there "should be a procedure in place to ensure that national security claims are
mounted only as a last resort after all appropriate steps, using cooperative means, have
been taken to disclose information or documents in ways that do not involve an unacceptable risk to the State's national security interest. If nevertheless a State is able to demonstrate that it has cooperated fully with the Court and, acting in good faith, claims that its
sensitive information or documents ought not to be disclosed.., the Court should have the
power to set aside such a claim only in exceptional circumstances.").
116. See supra note 92.
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Court exercise its discretion to overrule the state's claim to national
security. In other words, states acting in good faith vis-A-vis the Court
need not fear that issues of national security will be made public. To
be sure, this will be a difficult system to implement, in particular because the Court is removed from the political realities of the state. If
a state can demonstrate that it co-operated and acted in good faith
when it argued that certain documents should not be disclosed, the
Court should set aside the state's claim in only exceptional
circumstances.
VII.

THE PROPOSED ICC TRIGGER MECHANISMS

Mr. Daqun opined that the issue of the available trigger mechanisms represents one of the most complex and important questions in
the Statute. "Trigger mechanisms" refer to the way in which proceedings are initiated before the Court. The original ILC draft envisioned
only two trigger mechanisms-state complaints and referrals by the
Security Council. In subsequent deliberations, an ex officio role for
the prosecutor was proposed. This latter option raises five issues: (1)
the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court; (2) the relationship
between the Security Council and the ICC; (3) the ex officio power of
the prosecutor; (4) complaint procedures; and (5) temporal issues.
Judge Arbour proposed to examine serious proposals regarding
trigger mechanisms with respect to: (1) the principle of reality, i.e.
against what has been learned through the work of the ad hoc international tribunals; and (2) the language of the ICC Statute's preamble,
which receives wide support from states. She noted that the preamble
contains fundamental principles that are to guide the implementation
of the Statute.1 1 7 First, the ICC is being established because states desire to enhance the effective prosecution and suppression of international crimes. In other words, the international community desires to
enforce international law more effectively and more universally than
it has done in the past. The conclusion to be drawn from this statement is that the provisions governing the ad hoc tribunals provide the
minimum standard for the ICC. Second, the ICC is to prosecute only
the most serious crimes against international law. And third, the
Court is to complement national systems and operate only when the
117. The full Preamble reads: "Desiringto further international cooperation to enhance
the effective prosecution and suppression of crimes of international concern, and for that
purpose to establish an international criminal court; Emphasizing that such a court is intended to exercise jurisdiction only over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole; Emphasizing further that such a court is intended to be
complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial processes may
not be available or may be ineffective; Have agreed as follows..." 1998 Report, at 10.
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latter are either unwilling or unable to prosecute violations. These
principles raise the question of whether it is possible to respect the
first principle in light of the second and third propositions.
The current negotiations concern three different trigger mechanisms. The first, Security Council referrals, is uncontroversial, but it
remains to be considered if this provision is in fact deceptively simple.11 According to the U.N. Charter, the ICC treaty cannot legally
restrict the powers of the Security Council.' 19 This mechanism raises
the question of whether the Security Council in a referral could detract from the treaty structure or whether it is bound to accept the
structure as implemented. For example, it appears that the Security
Council could add the duty to comply with the work of the Court with
respect to a particular prosecution even if the Statute does not so provide. A Security Council referral would also apparently override issues of primacy, prospectivity and state consent. If this is not the case,
then the ICC will not enhance the prosecution of war crimes; rather, it
will represent a major step backwards and result in a weaker juridical
environment than what the Security Council could create in an ad hoc
tribunal. Given that only the Security Council can impose universal
enforcement of international humanitarian law, Council referrals represent the most promising route to jurisdiction before the ICC.
Other trigger mechanisms suffer from a lack of universality in application. Under the state complaint referral process, the prosecutor
could only commence an investigation if a state party refers a matter
to it. 120 Under the current proposals, the prosecutor would have to
gain the consent of all relevant states-i.e., the territorial state, the
state of the nationality of the accused, the state where the crime occurred-before prosecuting. 121 This represents an enormous constraint on the functioning of the Court and threatens to create bizarre
and intractable jurisdictional disputes. This referral option also suffers
from an air of unreality. Judge Arbour emphasized that she knows
from experience that states are reluctant to implicate other states in
violations of international law. To be sure, a state referral will generally implicate an individual rather than a state; however, international
crimes are often highly charged political events and states will un118. See Article 10, 1998 Report, at 40.
119. U.N. Charter, Article 103 ("In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.").
120. 1998 Report, Article 11 (A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in
which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the court appear to have been
committed...").
121. 1998 Report, Article 7.
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doubtedly remain reluctant to refer a matter to the Court that could
generate diplomatic or political repercussions.
Ex officio powers for the prosecution have not yet been provided
for in the Statute of the ICC. The fear of some states is that the prosecutor will assume the role of "Master of the Universe" and commence
unjustified or politically-motivated prosecutions. In Judge Arbour's
opinion, these fears are unfounded. First, it is clear that any investigation initiated by the ICC prosecution would be limited by the consent
regime contained within the Statute. Second, the experience of the ad
hoc tribunals demonstrates that the tribunals can do nothing without
state cooperation at all levels: financial, practical, symbolic and others.
Even with vast prosecutorial discretion, the prosecution would be
severely hampered if she acted without a broad international consensus in support of a particular investigation. The criminal law is inherently coercive, but it is also based on consensus. If the ICC's
prosecutor were to act otherwise he or she would risk the self-destruction of the Court. Third, the prosecution in exercising ex officio powers would still be bound by the other terms of the Statute dealing with
complementarity and admissibility. Once there has been an assumption of jurisdiction, numerous other forces could come into play and
prevent the prosecution from going forward even with the consent of
the states involved. For example, certain proposals envision a role to
be played by a Security Council veto. A prosecution may also be
stopped by the admissibility provisions, i.e. if another state has commenced a prosecution acting under one of the four bases of
jurisdiction.12 2
Mr. Zhu noted that "ex officio powers" mean that such powers
are natural or inherent to the position. To satisfy concerns of states, it
will be necessary to construct a mechanism to prevent abuses of power
by the prosecution. It is clear from the draft Statute that states have
some doubts about the possibility that the prosecutor may have freedom to initiate investigations and prosecutions. He is of the view that
while the prosecution must be entitled to initiate proceedings, there
must be some checks and balances on this power, as was proposed by
Mr. Liu.
On a final note, Judge Arbour noted with approval that proposals
have begun to envision the referral to the Court of a "matter" or "sit-

122. 1998 Report, Article 15 (providing that a case is inadmissible where "(a) the case is
being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it...").
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uation" rather than a "case" or a "defendant. ' 123 The employment of
the latter terms in prior proposals demonstrated a misunderstanding
of the way in which an investigation and prosecution proceeds in that
they assume that the prosecution has identified a suspect when it commences an investigation. In the experience of the ad hoc tribunals, the
investigations are crime, rather than suspect, driven. In other words,
the investigation commences with the perpetration of an international
crime and the identification of a perpetrator occurs later in the process. Mr. Zhu agreed that it is preferable that situations and not cases
be referred to the Court.
In Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it was not clear at the beginning how
many "cases" there would be. For example, at the Vukovar Hospital
massacre, it was known that at least 400 individuals were killed, but it
was unknown for some time who was responsible.' 24 Likewise, in
Rwanda, it was known that a nation-wide genocide had occurred, but
again it was unclear how many individuals would ultimately be found
responsible. Only in the process of investigating would it become clear
how many "cases" exist. If the Court is based on a system in which
"cases" rather than "situations" are referred to it, the prosecutor in
undertaking an investigation may come across related cases that were
not officially referred to her. If she is bound to ignore these other
cases, this would contravene the preamble of the Statute for the ICC,
which indicates that the goal is to prosecute serious violations of inter25
national criminal law.'
Professor Malanczuk discussed the role of the Security Council to
refer "situations" to the ICC. All states agree on the importance of
having a Security Council referral mechanism; however, there is disagreement over the full scope of the role to be played by the Council.
The following positions vis-A-vis the role of the Security Council have
been articulated. First, there are those states that would like to deny
the Council a role apart from its referral competence. This position is
held by India, several African countries and some of the so-called
"like-minded states." The second position as advanced by the United
States, China and two other Security Council members is that the
123. See, e.g., Article 11, 1998 Report, at 42 ("[[A State Party... ]] may lodge a complaint [referring to a [matter] [situation] in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed to] [with] the Prosecutor...").
124. See The Prosecutorv. Mile Msksic et al., Indictment, Case No. IT-95-13a-I (2 December 1997).
125. According to the final Statute at Article 13, states and the Security Council will
refer "situations" rather than individuals or cases. Once a situation has been referred to
the Prosecutor, he or she may proceed to investigate any particular case within that
broader situation.
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prosecution should not be able to proceed without receiving express
authorization from the Council. 2 6

Under this system, each member of the permanent five could exercise its veto and prevent a particular situation from being addressed
by the Court. In other words, all members of the permanent five
would have to agree in order for a particular prosecution to proceed,
and a single veto could impede prosecution. The third position, the so-

called "Singapore Compromise" because it was proposed by delegates
of that state, would allow the Council with the requisite votes to block
a prosecution for a limited period. In other words, all members of the
permanent five would have to agree to thwart a particular prosecution, and without this consensus, the prosecution would go forward. 127

This is the position supported by the like-minded states and most recently the United Kingdom. The United States has indicated that it
may accept this provision in connection with changes in certain other
related provisions.
With respect to the relationship between the Security Council
and the Court, Mr. Daqun noted that the Council is uniquely responsible for maintaining international peace and security.' 2 8 Under Article
103 of the UN Charter, all states are bound by decisions of the Council acting under Chapter VII. 2 9 This applies equally to non-state parties to the ICC Statute. Certain state proposals provide that no
prosecution could be commenced with respect to situations "being
dealt with" by the Security Council under Chapter VII unless the
Council specifically authorizes such prosecutions. 3 ' Critiques of this
proposal have noted that the Court will be a judicial body and the
126. See Article 10, 1998 Report, at 40-42.
127. See Article 10(7) (Option 2), 1998 Report, at 42 ("no prosecution may be commenced [or proceeded with] under this Statute [for the period of twelve months] where the
Security Council has [decided that there is a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of
aggression and], acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [given a
direction] [taken a [formal and specific] decision] to that effect.").
128. U.N. Charter, Article 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
129. See supra note 119.
130. See Article 10(7) (Option 1), 1998 Report, at 41-2 (["No prosecution may be commenced under this Statute arising from a [dispute or] situation [[pertaining to international
peace and security or an act of aggression] which [is being dealt with] [actively] by the
Security Council] [as a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression] [under
Chapter VII of the Charter], [where the Security Council has decided that there is a threat
to or breach of the peace and for which it is exercising its functions under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations], [unless the Security Council otherwise decides] [without prior consent of the Security Council].")
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Council is a political one, so the latter should not be able to block the
former from responding to a violation of international criminal law.
The so-called "Singapore Compromise" would reverse the role of
the veto power in determining whether a prosecution goes forward.
According to this proposal, no investigation may be commenced
where the Council acting under Chapter VII decides to block an investigation. This slight language change makes a world of difference.
Under the original system, the Council would have to decide to authorize a prosecution; under the Singapore proposal, the Council
would have to decide to block a prosecution. According to Mr. Daqun, this proposal still runs counter to the principle of an independent
Court. It risks that a decision of the Court will contradict a decision by
the Council, for example as might occur with respect to a determination of aggression. The question is, will the permanent five go along
with this scheme? The Court's effectiveness requires the support of
powerful states. Without this, it will be impossible to generate adequate political and economic support for the Court to operate effectively. Mr. Liu was doubtful as to whether the members of the
permanent five would be willing to cede this much authority over the
operation of the Court.
With respect to ex officio powers proposed for the prosecutor,
Mr. Liu noted that this issue continues to be contentiously debated.
This proposal would allow the prosecution to commence an investigation on the basis of information obtained from "any" reliable source,
including individuals, victims, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), governments and U.N. bodies. 131 The putative rationale for
this option is two-fold: (1) it is argued that this proposal guarantees
the independence of the prosecutor; and, (2) the proposal is modeled
on the structure of the ICTY and ICTR. The first rationale confuses
different stages of the process. After an investigation is commenced
under either a State Party or a Security Council referral, the prosecution will engage in an independent investigation. It is at that stage in
the process that prosecutorial independence is appropriate rather than
at the case initiation stage.
Allowing individuals and groups the power to commence a prosecution provides a possibility of abuse. It creates too much discretion in
the hands of the prosecutor, who will become a "Master of the Universe" accountable to no one. With respect to the second rationale,
131. See bracketed Article 12, 1998 Report, at 44 ("The Prosecutor [may] [shall] initiate
investigations [ex officio] [proprio motu] [or] on the basis of information [obtained] [he
may seek] from any source, in particular from Governments, United Nations organs [and
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations].").
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the structures of the ICTY and ICTR are inherently different from
that of the proposed ICC. The former were established by the Security
Council and all member states must comply with resolutions of the
Security Council. The latter will be based on a state consent regime
and not all states will be Parties to the Statute. Without the consent of
the relevant state (i.e. the custodial, territorial, nationality state), it is
impossible for the prosecutor to conduct its investigation without infringing on the sovereignty of the state.
An alternative proposal has been suggested to temper the ex officio powers of the prosecution. According to this proposal, if the
prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to commence a
prosecution, he or she would refer the matter to a Pre-Trial Chamber
that could operate as a check on abuses of prosecutorial discretion
and ensure collective decision making.13 2 It would have to be determined how such a body would be composed, especially since such
judges would have more power than the permanent five with respect
to sovereignty. If all judges are from a single area or from like-minded
states, the Chamber will not operate as a real check.
According to Mr. Zhu, the Security Council referral, although uncontroversial, remains a sensitive issue. He observed that the Council
is a political body. It is widely believed that as a general principle of
justice, the judiciary should remain separate from politics. The Council has the specific responsibility for maintaining peace and security
pursuant to Articles 39, 40 and 41 of the Charter. By establishing the
two ad hoc tribunals, the international community has unequivocally
accepted that justice and peace are linked. The Charter is explicit in
stating that if there is a conflict between the Charter and other international obligations, the former prevails. Thus, if there is a conflict
between the treaty establishing the ICC and the Council acting under
Chapter VII, the Council's decision will be paramount.
Compared with the Statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals, the Statute of the ICC is more strict. The ICTY's Statute at Rule 47(A)(1)
provides that it is for the Prosecution to initiate prosecutions:
If in the course of an investigation the Prosecutor is satisfied that
there is sufficient evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has committed a crime within the jurisdiction
132. See also bracketed Article 13(1), 1998 Report, at 44 ("Upon receipt of information
relating to the commission of a crime under article 5, submitted by victims, associations
upon their behalf, regional or international organizations or any other reliable source, the
Prosecutor shall analyze the seriousness of the information.... If the Prosecutor concludes
that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to
the Pre-trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, together with any
supporting material collected.").
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of the Tribunal, he [or she] shall prepare and forward to the Registrar an indictment for confirmation by a Judge, together with supporting material.
If the confirming judge is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds
for concluding that the suspect committed the crime, he or she shall
confirm the indictment. 133 The corresponding provision in the draft
ICC Statute is the bracketed Article 13. According to this provision,
after a matter has been referred to the Court, if the prosecution has
grounds for believing a suspect committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, the prosecutor shall prepare a request for authorization of an investigation, i.e. not an indictment, and submit it to a PreTrial Chamber.' 34 The Chamber will conduct a hearing that is unlike a
confirmation hearing before one of the ad hoc tribunals because the
accused is present and can present arguments. This procedure is odd
because it is impossible to arrest an accused before the issuance of a
formal indictment.
Judge Arbour clarified that the establishment of the ICC does not
preclude the Security Council from establishing other ad hoc tribunals. But the reality is that there is only so much money available for
the enforcement of international humanitarian law. The multiplicity of
fora is troubling from the perspective of the consistent development
of the law. If the ICC does not receive enough work-i.e. if there are
no ex officio powers accorded to the prosecutor, or if the Court is
limited by state consent requirements, or if the Security Council cannot depart from the terms of the Statute in its referrals-the capacity
of the international community to enforce international humanitarian
law will be diminished. The result would be the transformation of the
ICC from a progressive to a regressive initiative.
Mr. Akhavan noted that states seem obsessed with the fear of
"abuse" of the ICC by either the Prosecutor or other entities trying to
provoke the exercise of jurisdiction. Rather, we should think in terms
of the principle of "good faith," which is a fundamental building block
of the international order. No institution can operate without good
faith. The best way to avoid manipulation is to have an independent
prosecutor who does not take orders from governments. Where states
are making the key decisions, they will operate on the basis of na133. See Rule 47(B), ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev.13 (9 and 10
July 1998) ("The Prosecutor, if satisfied in the course of an investigation that there is sufficient evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has committed a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, shall prepare and forward to the Registrar an
indictment for confirmation by a Judge, together with supporting material.").
134. See supra Article 13(1), 1998 Report, at 44.
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tional self-interest. At the ad hoc tribunal, the prosecutor has been
scrupulous in ensuring impartiality and lack of bias.
VIII.

THE IMPACT OF THE ICC ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

Ms. Roberge noted that despite clear enforcement provisions
within the Geneva Conventions, it is clear that this mechanism does
not function in practice. States have failed to enact implementing legislation and engage in prosecutions where necessary in part because
such prosecutions are difficult both politically and practically. In this
way, the ICC would provide a benefit to states because it offers a forum for the enforcement of international humanitarian law. Thus, it
would not necessarily fall to states to enforce the law and engage in
what may be politically awkward or practically difficult prosecutions.
The ICC also allows for a more consistent interpretation of international humanitarian law.
She emphasized that the biggest impact of the ICC will be on
individuals who are potential victims of international crimes. The
complex issues facing delegates at Rome should be considered in light
of the protection of victims-the fundamental aim of the ICC. At the
last PrepCom session, there were even more political considerations
on the table. States are forgetting that the ICC will impact only a few
states. The aim of the ICC is to deal with the Rwandas and the former
Yugoslavias of the world. She stressed that advocates for an ICC need
to better frame the discussion about the ICC to dispel what are clearly
unfounded fears that the ICC will be an appeals chamber rather than
an institution complementary to national systems. In particular, she
noted that the fear concerning peacekeepers is unfounded. Most
states sending peacekeepers into the field have a functional judicial
system so that these states will prosecute violations effectively. As
such, a case against a peacekeeper from one of these states would undoubtedly be inadmissible. The complementarity provisions ensure
that the ICC would not be triggered when to do so would bring the
Court beyond where it was designed to go.
She concluded by noting that missing from many of the debates
surrounding the form to be taken by the ICC is the humanitarian-as
opposed to legal or political-perspective. We must not forget that
humanitarian goals are behind the effort to establish a Court. The
hope is that the Court will guarantee better respect for international
humanitarian law. The Court would provide a deterrent in addition to
a retributive function. ICRC delegates in the field are already hearing
military people discussing the ICC.
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Mr. Jia expressed skepticism regarding the usefulness of the
Court. The complementarity provisions reverse the ICTY and ICTR
models, which are based on primacy for the ad hoc tribunals. In fact,
the ICC model is more accurately described as primacy for the national courts. He questioned whether there will be any role for the
ICC if the national courts assume jurisdiction over a case. He also
observed that these atrocities are uncommon in human history and
that international criminal jurisdiction has been exercised on only rare
occasions: Nuremberg and Tokyo and the ad hoc tribunals.
Ms. Beth Van Schaack, law clerk of the OTP, noted that the ICC
may encourage states to enforce international humanitarian law themselves because they do not want to be seen as reneging upon their
responsibilities under international law. The idea behind the ICC is
the enforcement of humanitarian law. Therefore, if the national jurisdiction is engaging in an effective and satisfactory prosecution, there is
rightfully no role to be played by the ICC. It is only where the national jurisdiction fails that the ICC would step in. The speaker opined
that Mr. Jia was perhaps too optimistic about the rarity of such largescale events and referenced the genocide committed by the Dergue in
Ethiopia, the genocide against the Armenians under Ottoman rule,
the genocide in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge era, the systemic
deportation of ethnic minorities in Uganda under Idi Amin, and the
systemic disappearances and torture in Latin America.
Professor SHAO Lin concluded that it is the hope that the ICC
will provide the world community with a useful forum to prosecute
war criminals and perpetrators of other international crimes of grave
international concern. The future treaty should retain flexible jurisdictional provisions so that jurisdiction is consensual and there is a balance between national sovereignty and international control.
Nonetheless, he noted that in a conflict of law situation, international
law normally will prevail. He assured participants that the concerns of
states can be accommodated in a well-drafted treaty. Professor James
LI closed the proceedings with the observations that for a 1000 mile
journey, the first step is important, so make sure it is in the right
direction.
IX.

EPILOGUE: THE RESULTS OF THE
ROME CONFERENCE

1. The 1998 Negotiations in Rome and the Promulgation of a
Consensus Statute
The Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court convened from 15 June to 17
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July 1998 (Diplomatic Conference) and was attended by delegations
from almost 200 states, 1 35 over 30 observers and intergovernmental
organizations, and hundreds of non-governmental organizations
1 36
(NGOs) representing all segments of international civil society.
Never before have NGOs participated to such a degree in a treaty
drafting Diplomatic Conference.
Throughout the Diplomatic Conference, work proceeded at many
levels-in the Committee of the Whole, Working Groups, informal
meetings among states, and so-called "informal informals" attended
only by states. In the first three weeks of the conference, many of the
more technical provisions of the Statute were finalized and sent to the
Drafting Committee. However, by the fourth week, the most contentious issues-concerning the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court, the jurisdictional structure of the Court, the role of the Security
Council vis-A-vis the Court, and the available trigger mechanismsseemed no closer to resolution than they had at the beginning of the
Conference.
A Final Proposal was released piecemeal late July 16th and was
presented to delegations as a "take it or leave it" document. 137 On
July 17th, a packed and expectant Committee of the Whole "took it"
and adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
after the Committee soundly rejected eleventh hour amendments by
India and the United States. The Committee then moved to Plenary
during which time the United States requested an unrecorded vote on
the Statute. According to the official vote, only seven state delegations opposed the Statute. This was an unrecorded vote and only three
of the delegations took the opportunity to explain their vote (Israel,
the United States and China). As a result, the identity of the other
"no" votes remains a bit of a mystery, but it is widely believed that
they were Iraq, Iran, Qatar and Indonesia.' 38 After the vote, China
took an opportunity to explain its position:
135. Participants included 193 states, namely the 185 member states of the UN, plus the
six non-members (the Holy See, Kiribati, Nauru, Switzerland, Tonga and Tuvalu) and the
two territories in free association with New Zealand that participate in some UN organizations in their own capacity (the Cook Islands and Niue).
136. In 1997, the General Assembly passed a resolution recognizing the right of NGOs
to be invited to the Diplomatic Conference. U.N.G.A. Res. A/Res/52/160 (15 December
1997).
137. Bureau Proposal on Part 2: Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law, U.N.
Doc. No. A/Conf. 183/C.1/L.59 (10 July 1998).
138. The following states (21) abstained: Algeria, Bahrain, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and
Tobago, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.
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We have made many positive efforts to establish a fair and effective International Criminal Court. We have always held the view
that the Court should be an effective system, playing a supplementary role in international cooperation in judicial affairs. State consent should be the legal basis for the Court's jurisdiction. China
cannot accept the universal jurisdiction accorded to the Court over
core crimes. Granting the Prosecutor the right to initiate prosecutions places State sovereignty on the subjective decisions of an individual. The pre-trial chamber provisions to check those powers fall
short. The adoption of the Statute should have been on1 3consensus,
9
and not by vote. China voted against the draft Statute.
State delegations must now bring the Statute home for consideration and ratification by their national governments. The Statute shall
remain open for signature until 31 December 2000 and will enter into
force upon the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification.
2.

Crimes Subject to the Jurisdiction of the ICC in the Rome
Statute

The final Statute limits itself to the four core crimes-genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression, although a definition of aggression is still lacking. The definition of the crime of genocide was uncontroversial, and the Statute simply reproduced the
definition found in Article 2 of the 1948 Genocide Convention. 140 In
contrast, the definitions of the other three core crimes proved to be
quite contentious. With respect to so-called "treaty crimes," crimes
against U.N. personnel were subsumed within the war crimes section,
and as discussed below the other two treaty crimes will be considered
by the first Review Conference in accordance with Resolution E of
the Final Act and Article 123.
Pursuant to Article 12, states that ratify the Statute automatically
accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to all of the crimes
referred to in Article 5. However, as discussed below, states can "opt
out" of the Court's jurisdiction with respect to war crimes for a limited
period of time according to Article 124 (Transitional Provision). As
discussed during the Beijing Conference,1 4 1 an earlier draft of the
Statute had provided one option at Article 7bis for an "opt in" regime
governing one or more core crimes. In the Committee of the Whole
discussions, the majority of states insisted on automatic or inherent
139. U.N. Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, Press Release, L[ROM/22 (17 July 19).
140. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
141. See text accompanying supra notes 32, 101.
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jurisdiction for all core crimes. In contrast, China-joined by Algeria,
Brazil, Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Libya, Nigeria,
Oman, the Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Turkey, United
Arab Emirates, the United States, Uruguay and Yemen-supported
the "opt in" option. Further, states that are not Parties to the Statute
can "opt in" for the purpose of satisfying the preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction. 142
Prior to the Rome Conference, the draft Statute at Article 5 had
bracketed various elements of the definition of crimes against humanity, including the precise acts that would constitute crimes against humanity and (1) whether such acts had to be part of a widespread or
systematic attack or part of a widespread and systematic attack; (2)
whether such acts must have a nexus (or link) to armed conflict; and
(3) whether such acts had to be motivated by discriminatory intent.
China and a number of other states (Syria, United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, Kuwait and Iraq,
India, the Russian Federation and Ukraine) insisted that the Statute
include the war nexus requirement. With respect to the common elements of all crimes against humanity, the Canadian delegation successfully proposed a chapeau (heading) that deleted the war nexus
and the discriminatory intent requirement that had been suggested in
previous definitions of the offense. It also provided that the enumerated acts "must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack." The text includes the disjunctive formula-the attack must
be widespread or systematic-as opposed to a conjunctive formularequiring that the attack be widespread and systematic. The drafters
adopted the Tadic formula for mens rea, requiring that the defendant
act with knowledge of the existence of this attack.' 4 3
With respect to the war crimes provisions, controversy emerged
over the so-called threshold provision that was originally proposed by
the United States. In the final Statute, Article 8(1) provides for a
threshold requirement for all war crimes: the Court has jurisdiction
over war crimes "in particularwhen committed as a part of a plan or
policy or as a part of a large-scale commission of such crimes" (emphasis added). In the Diplomatic Conference, China (along with Algeria, Ghana, India, Iran, Israel, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Russian
142. Rome Statute, Article 12(3) ("If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to
the Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the
Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in
question.").
143. See Payam Akhavan's discussion during the Beijing Conference at text accompanying supra note 50.
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Federation, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, the United States and Uruguay) supported the original U.S. proposal, which would have limited
the Court's jurisdiction to war crimes "only when committed as part of
a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes"
(emphasis added). Given that the vast majority of states argued for no
threshold requirement, the "in particular" formulation emerged as a
compromise position.
Article 8 of the Statute governs war crimes committed in both
internal and international armed conflict, but the list of crimes relevant to international war is much longer than that for civil wars. Since
almost all contemporary conflicts are "non-international," this disparity limits the scope of the Statute. There was general consensus from
the outset that the Statute should cover "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This provision governs certain
acts (which include wilful killing, torture, wilfully causing great suffering, extensive destruction of property and the taking of hostages)
when committed against persons or property "in the hands of" a party
to an international armed conflict.
Until almost the end of the Conference, the inclusion in the Statute of war crimes committed in internal armed conflict remained uncertain. China in particular (joined by Algeria, Bahrain, India,
Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, the
Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay and Viet Nam) opposed any mention in the Statute of war crimes committed in internal armed conflict.
A handful of states would have accepted the inclusion of war crimes
committed in internal armed conflicts only in the case of the complete
collapse of the state as occurred in the former Yugoslavia. Indonesia,
the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam argued that war crimes committed within internal armed conflicts should be excluded from the
Court's jurisdiction if there is an element of "foreign interference" in
the conflict. A few states could accept the inclusion of Article 8(2)(c),
which reproduces the text of common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, but not Article 8(2)(e), which tracks the
text of the Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions. These
states justified their opposition on the grounds that they were not parties to Protocol II even though it is widely believed that many of the
acts listed there are criminalized under general international law."'
In order to render sub-paragraph 2(e) more palatable, the Bureau added sub-paragraph (f) which provides that sub-paragraph 2(e)
"applies to armed conflicts that take place in a territory of a state
144. See Marie-Claude Roberge's discussion during the Beijing Conference at text accompanying supra note 45.
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when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental armed
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups." The
language chosen renders it more likely that internal armed conflicts
will come within the terms of the Statute because it does not require
dissident troops to be under responsible command or to control territory and it applies to armed conflicts between dissident groups. Both
sections (c) and (e) are governed by the proviso at Article 8(3) that
nothing in these sections "shall affect the responsibility of a Government to maintain and re-establish law and order in the state or to
defend the unity and territorial integrity of the state, by all legitimate
means." The Statute also emphasizes that in order for a situation to
constitute an armed conflict, it must involve armed confrontation of a
military nature between two or more armed groups. As such, riots and
demonstrations do not amount to armed conflicts within the meaning
of these provisions.
The Statute contains a separate "Transitional Provision" that limits the jurisdiction of the Court specifically with respect to war crimes:
a State, on becoming a party to this Statute, may declare that, for a
period of seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the
State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with
respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 [war crimes]
when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or
on its territory. A declaration under this article may be withdrawn
at any time.
In other words, once a state becomes a party to the Statute, it has the
right to declare that it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court
over war crimes committed in both international and internal armed
conflicts in their territory or by their nationals for a period of seven
years after the Statute's entry into force with respect to that particular
state. This proposal emerged as an alternative to the "opt in" regime
that appeared as an option in the final draft Statute and that would
have required states to specifically accept the jurisdiction of the Court
145
with respect to certain crimes.
In the Committee of the Whole discussions, over eighty countries
indicated that they wanted aggression included in the Statute, although over half wanted a more precise definition or a definition that
included more elements from General Assembly Resolution 3314.146
Despite broad support for the inclusion of aggression generally, even
by the end of the Conference, states were unable to devise a satisfac145. See text accompanying supra notes 32, 101.
146. See discussion of Mohamed Othman during the Beijing Conference at supra note
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tory definition of the crime. In the Statute, aggression is listed at Article 5 as a core crime that will come within the jurisdiction of the Court
"once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 110 and 111
defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the
147
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.
The inclusion of aggression in the Statute gives rise to special
concerns about the role of the Security Council vis-A-vis the Court. As
was discussed in the Beijing Conference, the draft Statute provided
two options for this role.14 8 Under one option, the Court would not
have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression unless the Security
Council first determined that the state that is the subject of the complaint engaged in an act of aggression. Under the second option, a
determination that a state committed an act of aggression was to be
binding on the deliberations of the Court. In the Diplomatic Conference, China-along with Bangladesh, France, Japan, Malawi, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Thailand, the United Kingdom
and the United States-argued that before the Court would have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, the Security Council must first
conclude that an act of aggression had in fact occurred. Other states
opposed any role for the Security Council in the prosecution of acts of
aggression. These states argued that such a political decision should
not taint the work of a judicial body and that the Council rarely labels
the acts of states as acts of aggression. The final Statute leaves open
the role to be played by the Security Council with respect to the determination of an act of aggression when it indicates at Article 5(2) that
when a provision governing aggression is adopted it shall "be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations."1'49
Finally, the draft Statute contemplated that the Court would have
jurisdiction over three so-called "treaty crimes"-crimes of terrorism,
crimes against United Nations and associated personnel, and crimes
involving the illicit traffic in narcotics. A group of vocal states argued
that all three crimes should be included. By the end of the conference,

however, China along with the vast majority of states (including Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, the Czech

Republic, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Israel, Japan, the Republic of
Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, the Netherlands, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
147. Rome Statute, Article 5(2).
148. See discussion at supra notes 37-43.
149. Rome Statute, Article 5(2).
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the United States, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Yemen) argued against the
inclusion of treaty crimes at all, many ostensibly on the basis of lack of
time. Ultimately, crimes of narcotics and terrorism were not included
in the Statute. Resolution E of the Final Act recommends that the
Review Conference "consider the crimes of terrorism and drug crimes
inclusion
with a view to arriving at an acceptable definition and their
' 150
"
Court.
the
of
jurisdiction
the
within
crimes
of
list
in the
3.

State Cooperation and Jurisdictional Primacy in the Rome
Statute

The principle of complementarity represents a bedrock principle
of the Court that first finds expression throughout the Statute. Article
17 governing admissibility elaborates that the Court cannot proceed
with a particular case unless the state is "unwilling or unable genuinely" to carry out the investigation or prosecution. 5 1 In other words,
the principle of complementarity establishes a relationship of primacy
for the national criminal justice system. Article 17 was debated intensely at prior negotiation sessions, but was subject only to slight
drafting changes at the Rome Conference. It is notable that the phrase
"unwilling or unable" is only vaguely defined, and appears to allow
the Court considerable discretion in asserting its jurisdiction. According to Article 19, it is within the competence of the Court to determine whether it has jurisdiction under the principle of
complementarity, subject to challenges by the accused, states which
have jurisdiction over the case, or states from whom acceptance of
jurisdiction is required under Article 12.152
The Statute contains several provisions governing state coopera1 53
States are under a general obligation to "cooperate fully with
tion.
the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court."' 5 4 The Court is empowered to make requests
for cooperation, and it has recourse to the Security Council when a
150. Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the

Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. AIConf.183/C.1/L.76/Add.14
(16 July 1998) at p. 8.
151. Rome Statute, Article 17(1). This article outlines a series of factors to be taken into

account to make this determination: if, for example, there is unjustified delay, the proceedings were not conducted impartially, or there is a complete collapse of the judicial system.
See Rome Statute, Article 17(2) and (3).
152. Rome Statute, Article 19(2).

153. See, e.g., Rome Statute, Articles 59, 87, 89, 93 and 98.
154. Rome Statute, Article 86.
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state fails to comply with such a request as was discussed during the
Beijing Conference.1 5 5
4.

National Security Concerns Before the ICC

The provisions concerned with national security within the Statute were intensively debated during the Rome Conference. 5 6 Under
the Rome Statute, states are entitled to deny a request for assistance,
in whole or in part, but only if the request concerns the production of
materials that relate to national security. 157 Article 72 addresses those
cases "where the disclosure of information or documents of a state
would, in the opinion of that state, prejudice its national security interests." The Article obliges states and the Court to attempt to resolve
this dispute by cooperative means by, inter alia, providing summaries
or redactions, limiting disclosures, using in camera or ex parte proceedings or other protective measures. Once such cooperative means
are exhausted, the Court is then empowered to undertake a number
of actions. Most importantly, the Court may conclude that the requested state is not acting in accordance with its obligations under the
Statute.15 8 This determination invokes the remedies contained within
Article 87(7), which provide that
Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by
the Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby
preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under
this Statute, the Court may make a finding to159
that effect and refer
the matter to the Assembly of States Parties.
There is no recourse to the Security Council unless the Security Council referred the matter to the Court. 6 ° However, the Statute warns
that the non-cooperation of a state may impact the trial of the accused
in question as the Court may "make such inference in the trial of the
accused as to the existence of non-existence of a fact, as may be appropriate."' 6 1 The Court may also order disclosure, but there is no
162
mechanism created to enforce this order.
155. Rome Statute, Article 87; see discussion at the Beijing Conference at text accompanying supra notes 87-98.
156. See discussion at the Beijing Conference at text accompanying supra notes 113-116.
157. Rome Statute, Article 93(4).
158. Rome Statute, Article 93(7)(a)(ii)
159. Rome Statute, Article 87(7).
160. Id.
161. Rome Statute, Article 93(7)(a)(iii)
162. Rome Statute, Article 93(7)(b)(i).
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5. The Rome Statute's Trigger Mechanisms
Not surprisingly, questions of jurisdiction were among the most
controversial issues in the drafting of the Statute. The resolution of
these controversies was key to the attainment of a final agreement,
and will ultimately determine the power and effectiveness of the
Court. While the debate over jurisdiction was wrapped in legal language, it was primarily a political debate, inflaming passions not only
in Rome but also back in the capital cities.
Article 13 of the final Statute provides for three trigger mechanisms: referral of a situation to the Prosecutor by a State Party; referral of a situation to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter; and the proprio
motu (on his or her own motion) initiation of an investigation by the
Prosecutor. Referral of a situation by a State Party was by far the least
controversial trigger mechanism, but it is also generally regarded as
the least effective. Like-minded states and NGOs in particular argued
that states are more likely to succumb to political and economic pressures than the Security Council or an independent Prosecutor, and are
hence less likely to initiate proceedings against citizens of a state that
may take retaliatory measures. This fear finds significant support in
the behavior of states with regard to the referral procedures of existing human rights conventions and committees.
The final Statute allows any State Party to refer situations to the
Prosecutor. Other state referral options would have restricted the
right to refer situations to states that have accepted jurisdiction over
the crime in question, or to "interested" State Parties, such as the territorial state, custodial state, the state of nationality of the suspect,
and the state of nationality of the victim. The former option was initially supported by China and New Zealand. This proposal may have
restricted the possibility of state referrals, but it also may have reduced the possibility of politically-motivated referrals and may also
have provided an incentive to accept the jurisdiction over crimes.
The ability of the Security Council to refer situations was more
hotly contested. Although Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter
appears to give the Security Council the authority to maintain peace
and security by all means necessary, presumably also by referral to an
international tribunal, some states were concerned that such a referral
mechanism would unduly bolster the power of the Security Council.
India in particular was adamant about this point and pursued it until
the last evening of the Conference, when its final proposal to eliminate the role of the Security Council was soundly defeated in the
Committee of the Whole. Other delegations advocated inclusion of

HeinOnline -- 17 Chinese (Taiwan) Y.B. Int'l L. & Aff. 57 1998-1999

58

THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Chapter VI referral power by the Security Council or of referrals by
the General Assembly and/or the United Nations Human Rights
Commission in addition to or instead of the Security Council, but
these proposals expired in the face of opposition by the permanent
members of the Security Council and others. The final text simply acknowledges the authority of the Security Council to refer situations
under its 1Chapter
VII powers without any of the further
63
elaboration.

Going into the Rome Conference, there was some concern that
states on the Security Council would attempt to establish an exclusive
right to approve referral of situations or cases to the Court. This idea
was anathema not only to those states opposing any involvement of
the Security Council, but also to NGOs and like-minded states desiring a Court politically independent of the Security Council. The role
of the Security Council in approving or blocking prosecutions was
closely linked to the inclusion of aggression as a crime under the jurisdiction of the Court, since Article 39 of the Charter of the United
Nations reserves a special role for the Council in the determination of
aggression.
Once it became clear that aggression would not be immediately
included in the Statute, the debate over the power of the Security
Council to approve or block cases subsided somewhat. A version of
the "Singapore Compromise" appears in the Statue at Article 16, giving the Security Council the renewable right to defer investigations
164
and prosecutions for a period of 12 months.

By far the most controversial trigger mechanism was that of
proprio motu (or ex officio) initiation of investigations by the Prosecutor. 165 Article 15 grants the Prosecutor the power to launch investigations of his or her own accord, "on the basis of information on crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court.'

66

The Prosecutor is called upon

to "analyse the seriousness of the information received," drawing
from additional information provided by "states, organs of the United
Nations, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or
163. Rome Statute, Article 13(b).
164. Rome Statute, Article 16 ("No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or
proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a
resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested
the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same
conditions."). See discussion at the Beijing Conference at text accompanying supra notes
127-130.
165. See discussions at the Beijing Conference at text accompanying supra notes 117122 and 131-132.
166. Rome Statute, Article 15.
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other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate." The Prosecutor is then required to submit requests for authorization of investigation to a Pre-Trial Chamber, consisting of either a single judge or of
three judges elected to the Court. 16 7 The Pre-Trial Chamber examines
the request and decides whether there is a "reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation," including an initial assessment of whether
the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Court.
As has been discussed, the concept of the Pre-Trial Chamber
emerged as a response to concerns that a Prosecutor with proprio
motu powers would be too powerful unless he or she were embedded
within an effective system of checks and balances. The inclusion of the
Pre-Trial Chamber did little, however, to squelch the fear that granting proprio motu powers to the Prosecutor may trigger a "loose cannon" by providing the opportunity for politically motivated and
spurious prosecutions. This fear permeated the interventions of a
number of delegations throughout the Conference, including China,
the United States and the Russian Federation.
Based on the information provided to him or her, the Prosecutor
shall initiate an investigation according to Article 53, unless he or she
determines there is no reasonable basis to proceed, taking into consideration the likelihood that the crime has been committed, concerns of
complementarity and jurisdiction, the interests of the victims, the condition of the suspect, and so on. The Pre-Trial Chamber may, either
on its own initiative or at the request of the State Party making the
referral or the Security Council, review a decision of the Prosecutor
not to proceed and may request the Prosecutor to reconsider.
The bulk of NGOs, like-minded states and many African states
took the position that only a proprio motu Prosecutor could guarantee
the political independence of the Court. This coalition of advocates
for a proprio motu Prosecutor argued that individuals are less subject
to geopolitical manipulation than states and are less consumed by obtrusive self-interest than at least some of the permanent members of
the Security Council. In this regard, they cited the relative success of
the proprio motu prosecutors in the two international tribunals. These
states stood by their positions and ultimately carried the day.
Determining the preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction
emerged as the most important aspect of the deliberations.1 6 8 Early on
in the deliberations surrounding the Court, Germany and the United
States established themselves as the most vocal supporters of the two
extreme positions in the jurisdictional debate. Germany advocated
167. Id.; see also Article 38.
168. See discussions at the Beijing Conference at text accompanying supra notes 33-35.
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granting the Court "universal jurisdiction" over all core crimes, following the precedent set by some human rights conventions that indicate that these crimes may be prosecuted by all states. This proposal
would have created a true supranational criminal court with worldwide jurisdiction over the citizens of any state, not just State Parties.
This proposal was quickly branded as too "extreme" and premature
by its opponents. The United States, among others, argued that extending universal jurisdiction to a supranational court was in contravention of established international law and would seriously
undermine the legitimacy of the Court. It is also clear that the United
States was not willing to allow an international court to exercise jurisdiction over its own citizens without its consent (even though foreign
states routinely exercise jurisdiction over United States citizens and
the United States even more routinely exercises jurisdiction over foreign citizens). Proponents of this position felt the exercise of jurisdiction should be based on state consent.
Prior to the Rome Conference, the United Kingdom introduced a
compromise proposal between these two extremes that called for acceptance of jurisdiction by both the territorial state and the custodial
state. In the first debate of the Conference, the United Kingdom
modified its proposal, dropping the requirement of the custodial state.
Sometime advocates of the U.K. proposals included China and others.
Later, the Republic of Korea floated a compromise proposal resembling the German position that would have called for any one of the
following states to accept jurisdiction: the territorial state, the custodial state, the nationality state of the suspect, or the nationality state
of the victim. This proposal immediately attracted the interest of
many delegations and NGOs alike, since it was a more palatable variant approaching universal jurisdiction.
The final Statute's provisions are a compromise between the
United States and South Korean proposals. Accordingly, the Court
may exercise its jurisdiction in the case of State Party referral or
proprio motu investigation only if the "State on the territory of which
the conduct in question occurred" or the "State of which the person
accused of the crime is a national" has accepted jurisdiction of the
Court with respect to the particular crime in question (i.e. genocide,
war crimes or crimes against humanity). 69 The compromise solution
creates a Court with jurisdiction over the crimes committed by citizens
or on the territory of a Party to the Statute, unless a situation is referred by the Security Council. This solution severely limits the range
169. Rome Statute, Article 12(2).
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of cases that can be brought before the Court, given that a considerable number of states are likely not to ratify the Statute, and given that
citizens of many of these non-party states are likely to perpetrate
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
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